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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A DEVICE 
FOR PROTECTING THE INNOCENT 
Arnold H. Loewy* 
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." 1 The the-
sis of this Article is that the primary purpose of this provision is to 
protect the innocent. By "innocent," I do not mean totally innocent. 
(How many of us are?) I mean innocent of the crime charged or not 
in possession of the evidence sought. 2 
Implicit in this thesis are two interrelated (if not identical) pro-
positions: ( 1) It is not unreasonable for the police to search for and 
seize evidence of crime; and (2) there is no fourth amendment right 
to secrete such evidence, ie., the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not include the right to 
be secure from the government's finding evidence of a crime. 
If these propositions are correct, why has the Court invalidated 
so many searches and seizures that have produced evidence of 
crime? In many cases, the answer is that at the time of the search 
there was an insufficient probability of finding the evidence to justify 
the risk that an innocent person may be subject to the search. In 
legal jargon, the Court says that.the police lacked probable cause.3 
In other cases, the potential bias of the decisionmaker, be it a police-
man4 or an attorney general, 5 has caused the Court to invalidate a 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1963, 
Boston University; L.L.M. 1964, Harvard - Ed. The author is grateful to Lowell Ball, Rob-
ert Port, and especially Frederick S. Barbour, who provided helpful research assistance in the 
preparation of this Article. 
I. " ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. These two groups may not always be analytically identical. Nonsuspects who possess 
evidence of a crime arguably should receive more protection than a suspect who possesses such 
evidence. Although such a dichotomy was rejected by Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 549 
(1978), one might hope that that case may not be the last word on the subject. Cf. The Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV 1980) (generally prohibit-
ing searches of newspaper offices in favor of subpoenas, except where the government demon-
strates the likely failure of a subpoena in producing the evidence). 
3. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). 
4. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 9 (1977) 
5. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971). 
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search or seizure. The Court has reasoned that unless a neutral and 
detached magistrate makes the judgment to allow the search or 
seizure, there is an unjustifiably high risk that one "engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"6 will subject an 
innocent person to a search or seizure. 
Under this theory of the fourth amendment, a guilty person, 
lacking the right to secrete evidence, is essentially an incidental ben-
eficiary of a rule designed to benefit somebody else - an innocent 
person who is not before the court.7 Consequently, in construing the 
fourth amendment, the Court's primary focus should be on the effect 
of its pronouncements on the innocent. In fact, the Court's focus 
frequently has -been on the rights of the guilty, though rarely as 
flagrantly as in United States v. White 8 where it said: "If the law 
gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or 
becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same 
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
7. Although the fourth amendment functions primarily as a device for protecting the inno• 
cent, there are a few instances where a search for evidence of crime might be unreasonable. In 
these exceptional circumstances, the guilty would be "protected" by the restrictions the fourth 
amendment places on official search and seizure. 
A major consideration here is the relevance of the evidence sought to the alleged criminal 
conduct. For example, if the authorities have probable cause to suspect a law professor of tax 
fraud, could a warrant be issued to seize tax casebooks and other academic materials as "evi-
dence" of the professor's capability to defraud? Clearly, a threshold test of relevancy is needed 
or too many items would be subject to seizure as evidence of crime. The Court alluded to this 
problem in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), in which the Court abandoned the "mere 
evidence rule" (see Part I i'![ra), but cautioned that "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus ... 
between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." 387 U.S. at 307. See also United States 
v. Highfill, 334 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (once the items described in the warrant are 
discovered, search must cease). This concept, however, has not been developed in subsequent 
opinions. 
Another related issue is the type of search necessary to uncover evidence of certain criminal 
activities. Searches for documentary evidence, for example, require a broad and thorough 
search through nonevidentiary material before the seizable item is found. Such a search offers 
no protection for one's privacy interest in the nonevidentiary documents examined. q. 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of student newspaper's office for photo• 
graphs of demonstrators who had assaulted police upheld); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 
463, 479-82 (1976) (warrant held sufficiently specific despite presence of phrase authorizing 
seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown"). 
A third instance in which the guilty may be shielded by the protections of the fourth 
amendment occurs when the method used in obtaining evidence of crime is itself unreasona• 
ble. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (inducing petitioner to regurgi-
tate evidence "shocks the conscience" and violates due process), with Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (particular manner and method of warrantless seizure of blood 
sample found reasonable). 
Finally, the guilty might be "protected" if a search and seizure would implicate first 
amendment values. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (pursuant to a gen• 
era! warrant, officers seized more than 2,000 items, including petitioner's books, pamphlets and 
papers; constitutional prohibition of warrants that do not describe with particularity the things 
to be seized "is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude" when the first amendment is 
involved). These issues are of course beyond the scope of this Article. 
8. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
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agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later 
offered in evidence to prove the State's case."9 
Part I of this Article establishes that the government has a right 
to search for and seize evidence of crime. Part II develops the corol-
lary proposition that the fourth amendment does not protect the 
right to secrete evidence of crime. Part III explores the impact of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy concept on the innocent. Part IV 
evaluates consent searches and their effect on the innocent. Finally, 
Part V considers the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the 
innocent. 
I. THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO SEARCH FOR AND 
SEIZE EVIDENCE OF CRIME 
One could establish this premise simply by citing Warden v. Hay-
den .10 (Those readers who are satisfied with that can turn to Part IL) 
This premise is so important to my thesis, however, that it seems 
desirable if not critical to establish the correctness of that decision. 
The Court described the search, seizure, and accompanying inci-
dents as follows: 
About 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered the busi-
ness premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland. 
He took some $363 and ran. Two cab drivers in the vicinity, attracted 
by shouts of "holdup," followed the man to 2111 Cocoa Lane. One 
Driver notified the company dispatcher by radio that the man was a 
Negro about 5'8" tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket, and that he 
had entered the house on Cocoa Lane. The dispatcher relayed the in-
formation to the police who were proceeding to the scene of the rob-
bery. Within minutes, police arrived at the house in a number of 
patrol cars. An officer knocked and announced their presence. Mrs. 
Hayden answered, and the officers told her they believed that a robber 
had entered the house, and asked to search the house. She offered no 
objection. 
The officers spread out through the first and second floors and the 
cellar in search of the robber. Hayden was found in an upstairs bed-
room feigning sleep. He was arrested when the officers on the first 
floor and in the cellar reported that no other man was in the house. 
Meanwhile an officer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the 
noise of running water, and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush 
9. 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). 
IO. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Although I believe this premise should be obvious to the point of 
banality, some Justices (e.g., Douglas in Hayden) and commentators (e.g., White, Some For-
gollen Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 201 (1983)), maintain that 
the government may search for and seize evidence of crime only if it can assert a superior 
proprietary interest. In their view, it is the proprietary rather than the evidential character of 
the government's interest which justifies the search and seizure. 
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tank; another officer who, according to the District Court, ''was search-
ing the cellar for a man or the money" found in a washing machine a 
jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have worn. 
A clip of ammunition for the pistol and a cap were found under the 
mattress of Hayden's bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found 
in a bureau drawer in Hayden's room. All these items of evidence 
were introduced against respondent at his trial. 11 
After holding the search to be justified under "the exigencies of 
the situation,"12 the Court turned to Hayden's principal argument 
which was that the items of clothing were inadmissible because the 
government could assert no proprietary interest in the items seized: 
the clothing was neither contraband (which by definition Hayden 
had no right to possess); the fruit of a crime (e.g., stolen goods in 
which the government acting on behalf of the owner could assert a 
superior proprietary interest); or an instrumentality of crime (which 
at common law forfeited to the state).13 Hayden contended that ab-
sent any governmental proprietary interest, the government interest 
in his clothing was as "mere evidence," and therefore the seizure was 
per se unreasonable. 
The Court (per Justice Brennan) rejected this argument, describ-
ing the need for a proprietary interest as "a fiction, obscuring the 
reality that government has an interest in solving crime."14 Justice 
Douglas, on the other hand, was taken by the argument. In a lone 
dissent, he argued that the fourth amendment creates "two faces of 
privacy:" 
(1) One creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the 
police through raids, by the legislators through laws, or by magis-
trates through the issuance of warrants. 
(2) A second creates a zone of privacy that may be invaded either by 
the police in hot pursuit or by a search incident to arrest or by a 
warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of probable cause. 15 
Thus, Justice Douglas squarely aligned himself with the proprietary 
argument. 
In my view, no reasonable method of constitutional adjudication 
supports Justice Douglas' conclusion. To establish this proposition, I 
shall analyze the question by examining the relevant constitutional 
text, policy, history, and precedent. 
11. 387 U.S. at 297-98 (footnotes ommitted). 
12. 387 U.S. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)), 
13. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974) 
(statutory forfeiture scheme compared to co=on law by which the instrumentalities of crimes 
were forfeited to the sovereign). 
14. 387 U.S. at 306. 
15. 387 U.S. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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A. Text 
As is usually the case with expansively worded amendments, the 
text alone is not very enlightening. The word "unreasonable," how-
ever, is unique in the Bill of Rights, a document otherwise couched 
in absolute language. It is only through interpretation that guaran-
tees such as freedom of speech, 16 the right to counsel, 17 the right to a 
speedy trial, 18 and freedom from double jeopardy, 19 have been held 
to be less than absolute. But the fourth amendment, unlike these 
other provisions, implicitly tells us that some searches and seizures 
are reasonable. 
Perhaps the starkest textual contrast is with the third amendment. 
Like the fourth, it protects the right of the people to be secure in 
their homes. Unlike the fourth, however, it is absolute (except in 
time of war): "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law."20 If Douglas' reading of the fourth 
were correct, one might asume that it would have contained a di-
chotomy similar to the time of peace/time of war dichotomy in the 
third. For example, it might have read: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects shall not be violated, and there shall be no searches for nor 
seizures of evidence of crime unless the Government claims ownership 
of the property which it is seeking, in which case its search must not be 
unreasonable, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
I do not suggest that the difference between the actual wording of the 
amendment and my suggested pro-Douglas wording is dispositive. 
It is always easy to say that if the framers had meant to support a 
view with which one disagrees, they would have written the Consti-
tution differently. Nevertheless, the conditional wording of the 
fourth amendment, when contrasted to the absolute language of the 
rest of the Bill of Rights and partially absolute/partially relative lan-
guage of the third amendment, militates against the Douglas dissent. 
B. Policy 
To the extent that policy considerations are relevant in constitu-
16. E.g .• Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
17. E.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 36 7 (1979). 
18. E.g .• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
19. E.g .• Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
20. U.S. Const. amend. lll. 
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tional adjudication,21 there is little to commend the Douglas result. 
The importance of solving crime cannot be gainsaid. It is one of the 
most critical functions that a government can perform. Indeed, fail-
ure to perform that function can do as much if not more to destroy 
the people's right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects than the misguided efforts of a few overzealous policemen. 
Furthermore, there can be little doubt that an inability to obtain evi-
dence of crime would significantly impede obtaining convictions.22 
Thus, one must conclude that the government's interest in seizing 
evidence of crime is nothing short of compelling. 23 
Conversely, the government's interest in obtaining instrumentali-
ties of crime is often attenuated. To be sure, at common law, certain 
instrumentalities were seizable. An extreme example of this was 
sanctioned in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 24 in which 
the Court upheld the seizure of a yacht, aboard which a lessee pos-
sessed one marijuana cigarette.25 The yacht owner's lack of knowl-
edge or reason to know of the "crime," as well as the provision in the 
21. Professor Grey has argued that courts constitutionally apply policy considerations not 
articulated in the text of the Constitution in the course of judicial review. According to Profes-
sor Grey, the courts have a role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty 
and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressly attributable to the 
Constitution. See Grey, .Do We Have An Unwrillen Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975). 
Professor Grey's view is not universally shared. At the other end of the spectrum, Justice 
Black, Professors Ely and Wechsler, and others, have urged that the key to constitutional adju-
dication is fidelity to the constitutional text in judicial review. For a strong attack on judicial 
consideration of the wisdom of governmental policy, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also, Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!f: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I (1959). 
22. The Douglas result would create such an inability unless "instrumentalities" were de-
fined to include almost all material associated with criminal activity. See notes 31 & 66 iefra. 
23. Professor White appears to contend that taking one's property for the purpose of con• 
victing him is not a taking for a public purpose within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 
White, supra note 10, at n.21. Rather than accepting this unsupported assertion, I support 
Justice Black's precious remarks in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1969) 
(Black, J. dissenting): 
It is seemingly becoming more and more difficult to gain acceptance for the proposi• 
tion that punishment of the guilty is desirable, other things being equal. One commenta• 
tor [Professor Amsterdam] ... thought it necessary to point out that there is a "strong 
public interest in convicting the guilty." Indeed the day may soon come when the ever• 
cautious law reviews will actually be forced to offer the timid and uncertain contention, 
recently suggested satirically, that "crime may be thought socially undesirable, and its 
control a 'valid governmental objective' to which the criminal law is 'rationally related.' " 
(footnotes omitted). I might add that the fourth amendment's implicit approval of reasonable 
searches and seizures is also rationally related to redressing the socially undesirable phenome• 
non known as crime. 
24. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
25. "[S]o far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht.'' 416 U.S. 
at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
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lease forbidding criminal activity by the lessee, were held to be 
irrelevant. 
Even if one approves of the Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. result,26 it 
strains credulity to suggest that the government's interest in seizing 
that "instrumentality of crime" is more compelling ( or in fourth 
amendment terms, more reasonable) than its interest in seizing Hay-
den's jacket or other evidence of crime. 27 Yet, were Justice Douglas' 
position to prevail, the proverbial twenty bishops could swear that 
Hayden's jacket was in the washing machine, and still no magistrate 
would be empowered to issue a warrant to search for it; while on the 
other side of town, the government could commandeer a yacht for 
no better reason than that a lessee over the owner's objection pos-
sessed a marijuana cigarette on board.28 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the mere evidence 
rule is that by imposing some limit on what can be seized, it will tend 
to limit the scope of the search thereby maximizing privacy.29 In his 
Hayden dissent Justice Douglas quoted Learned Hand: 
[I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth 
Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which 
consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence 
against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make 
so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily 
not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no 
sound policy in protecting what does. Nevertheless, limitations upon 
the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself .... 30 
Several difficulties inhere in this position. First, the mere evi-
dence rule is an extraordinarily imprecise device for protecting pri-
vacy. While precluding the seizure of so innocuous an item as 
Hayden's jacket,31 it sometimes permits even books and records to 
26. To say the least, there are serious questions about its justice. 
27. I assume, of course, that the Court which treated the yacht as an instrumentality of 
crime would not accord similar treatment to Hayden's jacket. See notes 31 & 66 iefra. 
28. Justice Douglas' dissent in Pearson recognized that reliance on a proprietary theory of 
forfeiture could produce anomalous results: 
We deal here with trivia where harsh judge-made law should be tempered with justice. I 
realize that the ancient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate object itself is 
guilty of wrongdoing .... But that traditional forfeiture doctrine cannot at times be rec-
onciled with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 
416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
29. An interest which Justice Douglas has consistently sought to maximize. See, e.g., Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 382 U.S. 479 (1965). 
30. 387 U.S at 320-21 (quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
31. The argument could be made that Hayden's jacket and other clothing were instrumen-
talities of crime, for without them the robbery would have been committed in the nude. See, 
e.g., United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958), in which 
the court held that shoes worn by the defendant were instrumentalities because they "would 
facilitate a robber's getaway and would not attract as much public attention as a robber fleeing 
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be seized as insrtumentalities of crime.32 Second, as applied to Hay-
den, the search itself was clearly legitimate. Consequently, the mere 
evidence rule would not have narrowed the scope of the search.33 
Finally as Douglas and Hand themselves tell us: "[T]here can be no 
sound policy in protecting what does [incriminate]." 
C. History 
Research has disclosed no direct evidence supporting the propo-
sition that the framers favored or even thought about the mere evi-
dence rule.34 As Justice Douglas tells us: "The debates concerning 
the Bill of Rights did not focus on the precise point with which we 
here deal."35 Virtually every significant prerevolutionary search or 
seizure involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained warrant. Such 
things as warrants that did not name the person to be searched,36 did 
barefooted from the scene of the holdup." 251 F.2d at 4. Such an expansive definition of 
instrumentalities would of course swallow the rule. See also note 66 i,ifra. 
32. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (business ledger and bills 
for gas, electric, water and telephone seizable as instrumentalities since "they were convenient, 
if not in fact necessary, for the keeping of the account [for the illegal business]; and, as they 
were so closely related io the business, it is not unreasonable to consider them as used to carry 
it on"); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1930) (papers related to illegal trans-
action subject to seizure as instrumentalities). See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 59-71 (1969). Arguably, personal papers, such as diaries, 
may not be seizable with or without the mere evidence rule. See Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391 (1976) (fourth amendment); United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962) 
(fifth amendment). 
33. Although the rule would not have limited the search in Hayden, conceivably it might 
narrow the scope of a search authorized by a warrant. Even there it would not be limited in 
any way reasonably related to balancing the right of the innocent person on the one hand and 
the need to solve crime on the other. 
34. Much of what historical support there is for the mere evidence rule is collected in 
White, supra note 10. 
35. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
36. See Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 
(K.B. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). 
These cases arose from the Crown's search for the source of a pamphlet critical of the king, 
The North Briton Number 45, published April 23, 1763. A general warrant was issued by Lord 
Halifax, the Secretary of State, directing four of his messengers "to make strict and diligent 
search for the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper entitled The 
North Briton, No. 45, ... and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, 
together with their papers." N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (1931). Armed with this general war-
rant, the messengers exercised their absolute discretion as to whom or what they could search 
and seize. Within three days they arrested as many as 49 persons on suspicion. The messen-
gers eventually apprehended the publisher and printer of Number 45 and from them learned 
that John Wilkes, a member of Parliament, was the author. Id at 43-44. 
Orders were given to apprehend Wilkes under the authority of the general warrant. Upon 
examining the warrant, Wilkes declared it to be "a ridiculous warrant against the whole Eng• 
lish nation," and refused to obey it. Wilkes was brought before Lord Halifax, while an under• 
secretary of state, Wood, supervised the execution of the warrant. At Wilkes' home, the 
messengers seized all of his private papers (including his will and pocketbook) after a black-
smith had opened the drawers of Wilkes' cabinets. Id. at 44. 
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not precisely describe the items to be seized, 37 or that could be issued 
on conjecture or suspicion,38 were foremost in the framers' minds. 
Consequently, the amendment provided that "no Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized." 
Justice Douglas is unquestionably correct in his assertion that the 
framers intended to protect against more than improperly issued 
warrants. He notes that a proposed amendment which protected 
only against improper warrants was rejected in favor of one which 
forbade both unreasonable searches and seizures and improperly is-
sued warrants.39 This conclusion, however, only raises the question 
of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure; it does not 
answer it. 
To support his two-faced theory of the fourth amendment, Jus-
tice Douglas cites the Complaints of the Bostonians40 and a state-
ment made by Patrick Henry during the Bill of Rights debate in 
37. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 
1765). 
The Entick case arose out of a warrant issued by Lord Halifax in November 1762 to search 
for John Entick, the author of THE MONITOR OR BRITISH FREEHOLDER and seize him along 
with his books and papers. Unlike the warrants in the Wilkes cases, see note 36 supra, this 
warrant was specific as to the person, but general as to the papers subject to seizure. 
After a jury awarded damages in an action for trespass against Halifax's messengers, the 
case was brought before the Court of Common Pleas, where Lord Camden presided. In an 
opinion that our Supreme Court later called "one of the landmarks of English liberty" (Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)), Lord Camden found the warrant to be "wholly 
illegal and void." 95 Eng. Rep. at 818. See N. LASSON, supra note 36, at 47-48. 
38. See, e.g., John Adams' "abstract" of the argument of James Otis in Paxton's Case, 
Quincy Mass. Bay Rep. 51 (1761): "Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they 
please - we are commanded to permit their entry - their menial servants may enter - may 
break Jocks, bars and every thing in their way - and whether they break through malice or 
revenge, no man, no court can inquire - bare suspicion without oath is sufficient." M. SMITH, 
THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978) (quoting Adams in theMassachusells Spy of Apr. 
29, 1773). 
Otis' argument in Paxton's Case "was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugu-
rated the resistance of the colonies to the oppression of the mother country." Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616,625 (1886). See also M. SMITH,supra, at 7 n.9; N. LASSON,supra note 36, 
at 56-61. 
39. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316-17 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The text of 
the original House draft of the fourth amendment was: "The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, s};lall not be violated by warrants issuing without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J. Gales ed. 
1789). 
40. "The Bostonians complained that 'our houses and even our bed chambers are exposed 
to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by wretches, 
whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants.'" 387 U.S. at 315 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-
1791, at 25 (1955)). 
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Virginia.41 Neither of these sources remotely supports his theory.42 
He does find some support in the following four paragraphs from 
Lord Camden's famous Entick v. Carrington opinion: 
There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often 
tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or 
fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to 
get it back but by action. 
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet 
there were some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, 
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are 
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-
search in these cases to help forward the conviction. 
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards 
criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more 
pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. 
It is very certain, that the 'law obligeth no man to accuse himself; 
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling 
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; 
and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the 
same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the 
guilty.43 
41. "They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some 
similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, every 
thing you eat, drink, and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds." 387 U.S. 
at 316 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 ELLIOTS' DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNSTITU• 
TION 448-49 (1836)). 
42. If anything, the complaint of the Bostonians decries the arbitrariness and unbridled 
power associated with the issuance of a writ of assistance. There is no support in this short 
passage for Justice Douglas' assertion that the fourth amendment was promulgated to create 
certain "personal sanctuaries" into which the law could never reach. Rather, colonial con-
tempt for the writ of assistance was related to the lack of proper safeguards on its issuance and 
execution. For example, consider the following excerpt from the January 4, 1762, Boston Ga-
zelle, of an article probably written by James Otis: 
IT is granted that upon some occasions, even a british freeholder's house may be 
forceably opened; but as this violence is upon a presumption of his having forfeited his 
security, it ought never to be done, and it never is done, but in the cases of the most urgent 
necessity and importance; and this necessity and importance always is, and always ought 
to be determin'd by adequate and proper judges: Shall so tender a point as this is, be left 
to the discretion of ANY person, to whomsoever this writ may be given- shall the jeal-
ousies and mere imaginations of a custom house officer, as imperious perhaps as injudi-
cious, be counted a sufficient reason for his breaking into a freeman's house. . . . 
If one examines the entire statement of Patrick Henry from which Douglas quotes, it is clear 
that Henry's statement does not support a dual aspect of the fourth amendment. In the mate• 
rial immediately preceding the quotation, Henry states that 
In the present Constitution, they are restrained from issuing general warrants to search 
suspected places, or seize persons not named, with out evidence of the commission of a 
fact, &c. There was certainly some celestial influence governing those who deliberated on 
that Constitution; for they have, with the most cautious and enlightened circumspection, 
guarded those indefeasible rights which ought ever to be held sacred. . . . 
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448 (1836). This clearly gives an indi-
cation of what Henry meant when he demanded that excisemen "ought to be restrained within 
proper bounds." 
43. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 314 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Entick 
v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)). 
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Justice Douglas then concluded that "Lord Camden decided two 
things: (1) that searches for evidence violated the principle against 
self-incrimination; and (2) that general warrants were void."44 In 
fact, the language of the last quoted paragraph more naturally reads 
that both self-incrimination and searches for evidence confound the 
innocent with the guilty, rather than that a search for evidence is 
itself a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.45 
Thus, a fair reading of Lord Camden's opinion suggests that a 
search for evidence of crime is forbidden only when there is an un-
justifiably high risk that "the innocent would be confounded with 
the guilty."46 This reading is supported by the fact that the warrants 
at issue permitted search on suspicion, and named no individuals. 
Furthermore, the Entick search itself failed to uncover any evidence 
of crime. Additionally, both before and after Entick, a seizure of 
evidence as incident to a valid arrest was permitted.47 Finally, in 
explaining why the warrant to search for and seize stolen goods was 
issued, Lord Camden explained that the absence of the precautions 
which existed for the stolen goods warrant "is an undeniable argu-
ment against the legality of the thing."48 
If my reading of history is correct, it is necessary to rationalize 
the two clauses of the fourth amendment. The single theme running 
through the entire history of the fourth amendment is arbitrariness.49 
44. 387 U.S. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
45. T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 53. see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2264 n.4 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961) ("This language, it should be noted, ... states merely that both [the 
rule against self-incrimination and the rule against unreasonable searches] whatever they may 
proscribe, do so to protect the innocent from cruelty and injustice."). 
46. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073 (1765). 
47. Telford Taylor states that 
[t]here is little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee's person and premises is as old as 
the institution of arrest itself. That there are ver:y few traces of the matter in the early 
records is as true as it is natural, given a practice which was taken for granted. 
T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 28. The court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), 
observed that there existed "the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under 
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to dis-
cover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." 232 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). See also 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230-33 (1973). 
48. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 1067 (K.B. 1765): 
Observe .•. the caution with which the law proceeds [in the search for stolen goods]. 
There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed. - The owner must swear 
that the goods are lodged in such a place. He must attend at the execution of the warrant 
to shew them to the officer, who must see that they answer the description. - And, lastly 
the owner must abide the event at his peril: for if the goods are not found, he is a tres-
passer; and the officer being an innocent person, will always be a ready and convenient 
witness against him. 
49. See, e.g., John Adams' "abstract" of James Otis' argument against the Writ of Assist-
ance in Paxton's Case, Quincy Mass. Bay Rep. 51 (1761): 
It appears to me ..• [the writ of assistance is] the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the 
most distrustive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution, that 
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Thus, the grand criterion of the fourth amendment is that there shall 
be no arbitrary, ie., unreasonable, searches and seizures.so On this 
score it did not matter whether the search was unreasonable because 
of an improper warrant or otherwise. Indeed, since unreasonable 
searches frequently occur without a warrant, it was prudent of the 
framers to protect against them. 
Because the police frequently claimed to justify their search by 
an oppressive warrant, however, the framers especially felt the need 
to keep the issuance of warrants within bounds via a separate clause. 
Thus the government could not claim that a warrant rendered its 
search reasonable unless the necessary criteria were met. As Profes-
sor Telford Taylor put it: 
The power to search and seize must be kept within reasonable bounds. 
Warrants have been used to authorize dangerous and oppressive ar-
rests and searches, and therefore we will confine their issuance in line 
with specified requirements, developed for the common-law stolen-
goods warrant with which we are all familiar and which have never 
given any trouble.S 1 
Accordingly, the fourth amendment constrains both searches and 
seizures and the issuance of warrants. 
D. Precedent 
On only one occasion, Gou/ed v. United States,s2 has the Court 
invalidated a seizure exclusively on the ground that the items seized 
were mere evidence.s3 Relying on Boyd v. United Statess4 and 
ever was found in an English law-book. . . . Every man prompted by revenge, ill hu-
mour or wantonness to inspect the inside of his neighbour's house, may get a writ of 
assistance; others will ask it from self defense. One arbitrary exertion will provoke another 
until society will be involved in tumult and in blood. 
M. SMITH, supra note 38, at 552-54 (1978) (quoting Adams in the Massachuse/ls Spy of Apr. 
29, 1773). 
50. My use of "arbitrary" is broad enough to encompass that which Professor Amsterdam 
calls "unjustified" as well as "arbitrary" searches and seizures. See Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rev. 349, 411 (1974). 
51. T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 43-44 (footnote omitted). 
52. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
53. C.f. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 641, 408 P.2d 108, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 
(1965) (Traynor, C.J.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966) ("Although the [mere evidence] rule 
was never expressly repudiated, evidence was never suppressed because of it.") 
In this regard, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), should be examined. In 
Lefkowitz, federal agents executing an arrest warrant seized a number of business documents, 
utility bills and other matters relating to illegal liquor sales. The Court excluded evidence 
because: a) the search was too exploratory and general to be justified as a search incident to 
arrest; and b) the items seized were mere evidence of crime. On similar facts, the Court in 
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), had held that a business ledger and utility bills 
seized incident to a lawful arrest were admissible in evidence as instrumentalities of crime, 
In Thayer, Traynor concluded that the mere evidence rule was not the controlling rationale 
of Lefkowitz: 
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Weeks v. United States55 the Court found it "clear'' that search 
warrants 
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office 
and papers solely for the purpose of making a search to secure evi-
dence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but 
that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search 
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the com-
plainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the 
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders 
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it 
may be taken.56 
Clearly, Weeks does not support this result.57 Weeks involved a 
search and seizure of personal papers without a warrant and presum-
ably without probable cause. Under those circumstances the Court 
said: 
The United States Marshal could only have invaded the house of the 
accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Consti-
tution, upon sworn information and describing with reasonable partic-
ularity the thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he 
acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to 
bring further proof to the aid of the Government, and under color of 
his office undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct viola-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such 
circumstances, without sworn information and particular description, 
not even an order of court would have justified such procedure, much 
less was it within the authority of the United States Marshal to thus 
invade the house and privacy of the accused58 
The clear inference is that if the officer had a warrant and probable 
cause based on sworn information, the search and seizure would 
have been lawful. 
The enigmatic Boyd case, on the other hand, does support 
The difference [between Marron and Lefkowitz] was that in.Lefkowitz the officers did 
not limit themselves to seizing items plainly visible, but made a thorough search of the 
drawers, cabinets and waste-baskets. The court suppressed the evidence because the 
search was too broad, and because the items seized were mere evidence. The manner in 
which Marron v. United States was distinguished, however, hardly served to reinforce the 
Gouled rule. In Marron, the court said, the search was reasonable and the items were held 
to be instruments of the crime. Since the items seized and the offense charged were almost 
precisely the same in both cases, the distinction between the two cases was only the scope 
of the search. When the search was so broad as to be exploratory in nature, the mere 
evidence rule was resurrected as an alternative (and superfluous) ground for exclusion. 
When the search was otherwise reasonable, the same items became instruments of crime. 
63 Cal. 2d at 641, 408 P.2d at lll-12, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84. 
54. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
55. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
56. 255 U.S. at 309 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623-24). 
57. Indeed, some commentators ignore Weeks entirely when discussing the Gouled ration-
ale. See w. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.l(b) (1978). 
58. 232 U.S. at 393-94. 
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Gouled. This once venerable decision has been so thoroughly dis-
credited in recent years,59 that further attack seems like the prover-
bial beating of a dead horse. Yet an understanding of why Boyd is 
at once revered and condemned is helpful to understanding the ulti-
mate demise of the mere evidence rule. 
Boyd abounds with grandiose pronouncements.60 While those of 
us who write from ivory towers perhaps should not condemn grandi-
osity, even the grandest decision must fine-tune its pronouncements 
to the facts of the case if it is to remain viable. Boyd did not do this. 
Rather, it relied heavily on inapplicable quotations from Entick61 to 
forge the rule that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's 
. . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime 
. . . is within the condemnation of that judgement."62 Ironically, 
just one year later, a British court clearly rejected such an expansive 
reading of Entick, holding that it was designed to combat the evils of 
general warrants issued on suspicion. 63 
Gou!ed, on the other hand, expanded Boyd andEntick to exclude 
59. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391, 405-09 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-92 & 95 n.2 (1974); Couch 
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1973); T. Taylor, supra note 32, at 52-71. 
60. E.g.: 
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of 
actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and 
effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and 
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing 
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of proce-
dure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for 
the security of person or property should be liberally construed. A close and literal con-
struction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. 
116 U.S. at 635. 
61. See 116 U.S. at 627-29. As the concurring opinion in Boyd notes, the case did not 
involve an actual search and seizure; rather, the case turned on the validity of a subpoena-like 
process used to procure incriminating evidence. 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). In 
this respect Entick is not at all applicable, as that case developed from a forcible exploratory 
search of Entick's home under a general warrant. Therefore, the Court's use of Lord Cam-
den's discussion of the trespass remedy and his consideration of the stolen goods warrant was 
clearly not pertinent to the question at hand, except in a very general sense. See also note 45 
supra. 
62. 116 U.S. at 630. 
63. Dillion v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cases 245, 251 (1887). Although Dillon upheld a 
search incident to valid arrest during which evidence of crime was found, the court did not 
limit its holding to search incident situations: 
[The] purpose and object [of the seizure and detention of evidentary material is] de-
rived from the interest which the State has in a person guilty (or reasonably believed to be 
guilty) of a crime being brought to justice, and in a prosecution, once commenced, being 
determined in due course of law. 
16 Cox Crim Cases at 249-50. 
In finding that Entick v. Carrington did not support the concept of a "mere evidence" rule, 
the court reasoned that: 
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all mere evidence and not just private papers.64 Gou/eel's progeny is 
even shakier than its ancestry. The Supreme Court has never ex-
cluded evidence on the basis of Gou!ed that it would not have other-
wise excluded.65 Lower courts have distinguished Gou!ed in ways 
more illusory than real.66 It has never been applied to searches inci-
dent to an arrest. 67 At times, the Supreme Court has flatly ignored 
The right here claimed is not to take all the plaintiff's papers, but only those which are 
evidence of his guilt; and the claim is based, not as in Entick . . . , upon a warrant issued 
upon mere suspicion, but upon an allegation of actual guilt, and a lawful apprehension of 
the guilty person. If (by the law, as then understood) the right to seize evidences of guilt 
in the possession of the person charged was confined to cases of treason and felony, the 
judgment would have been rested on that simple ground, the care which was taken to 
show that the warrant embraced all papers would have been thrown away, and the whole 
of the elaborate judgment of Lord Camden would have been unnecessary. For myself I 
am satisfied that, in pronouncing that judgment, Lord Camden had not before his mind 
cases of seizure of evidences of guilt upon lawful apprehension, as distinguished from 
general warrants to seize all papers. 
16 Cox Crim Cases at 251. 
64. 255 U.S. at 309. After Hayden abolished the mere evidence rule, it remained possible 
that the fifth amendment might protect documents from seizure. This avenue was foreclosed 
by Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Bui cf. note 32 supra. 
65. See note 53 supra. 
66. See, e.g., United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d I, 3-4 (7th Cir 1958) (shoes worn by defend-
ant during commission of robbery found to be instrumentalities and admissible as evidence), 
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958); United States v. Stem, 225 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964) (handwritten sheets containing figures on the taxpayer's cost of living were seizable as 
instrumentalities since they "played asign!ftcanl role in the commission of the crime alleged" 
(tax fraud) (emphasis in orginal)); United States v. Currency in the Total Amount of$2,223.40, 
157 F. Supp. 300, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (money seized in a raid on a gambling establishment 
found to be instrumentality because "[a] sufficient amount of cash ... appears to [be] a neces-
sary and closely related implement or facility of the wagering business as transacted here"). 
67. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. The nonapplicability of the Gou/ed rule to 
searches incident to an arrest undercuts the often-used fifth amendment rationale behind the 
rule. For example, the Court in Boyd reasoned: 
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are 
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, 
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in 
a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
ll6 U.S. at 633. 
If, however, it was the accepted common law practice to use any evidence uncovered dur-
ing a search incident to a valid arrest, see note 47 supra, then there seems to be no reason why 
"mere evidence" uncovered during the execution of a valid search warrant could not be used. 
If the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination was not implicated in the 
search incident situation, it would not be implicated in the search warrant situation. 
By following Boyd's dicta, the Gou/ed Court further confused "[t]he fact ... that there is 
no 'intimate relation' between the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments .... '[T]he principles 
of the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments are complementary to each other; what the one 
covers, the other leaves untouched.'" J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2264 at 383 n.4 (McNaughton 
rev. ed. 1961). 
Whereas the Fifth Amendment forbids the use of any force whatever to compel a person 
to testify or to produce evidence of his wrong, the Fourth permits the use of all the 
strength of government to extract from a man's possession things which will convict him 
... In short, while the Fifth Amendment shields the person of the individual in unquali-
fied terms, the Fourth Amendment affords no such protection for his possessions or even 
his person if he resists the search, but rather, recognizing that possessions may be seized 
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it.68 In short, when Hayden officially buried the Gou/ed rule, it 
merely rendered offical what had been the law sub rosa for years. 
Thus, by any method of constitutional adjudication, Hayden was 
clearly correct in announcing that the government has the right to 
search for evidence of crime. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIGHT 
TO SECRETE EVIDENCE OF CRIME 
If the fourth amendment permits the government to search for 
and seize evidence of crime, it should follow that an individual has 
no inherent right to secrete such evidence. Consequently, the fourth 
amendment should be understood as a device to separate the wheat 
(evidence of crime) from the chaff (that which individuals may pos-
sess free from government prying). In a Utopian society,69 each po-
liceman would be equipped with an evidence-detecting divining rod. 
He would walk up and down the streets and whenever the divining 
rod detected evidence of crime, it would locate the evidence. First, it 
would single out the house, then it would point to the room, then the 
drawer, and finally the evidence itself. Thus, all evidence of crime 
would be uncovered in the most efficient possible manner, and no 
innocent person would be subject to a search. In a real society (such 
as ours), the fourth amendment serves as an imperfect divining rod. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Principal X of Y High 
School, because of a hunch that students A, B, and C each have 
marijuana in their respective lockers, opens the lockers with a pass-
key. InA's locker, he finds marijuana, which is subsequently given 
to the police and used to convict A of possession of marijuana, for 
which A receives a year's imprisonment. In B's locker he finds a 
picture of his (Principal.X's) head attached to the rear end of a horse 
with the caption: "X is a Horse's Ass." In C's locker, he finds a 
picture of C's mother with the caption: "Mom." 
by might seeks to spell out limitations which will strike a fair balance between a man's 
privacy in his things and the duty of government to protect all citizens from criminal 
conduct. 
State v. Bisacci, 45 N.J. 504, 509, 213 A.2d 185, 187-88 (1965). 
68. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1960), in which the Court upheld a 
warrantless seizure of petitioner's blood, which was later introduced in evidence leading to 
petitioner's conviction for driving while intoxicated. This search and seizure was clearly for 
the purpose of gathering evidence only. 
It should be noted that although Schmerber involved a search incident to arrest, most 
courts would require a warrant or other procedural safeguard before sanctioning a bodily in-
trusion. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 
U.S. 1062 (1977) (upholding trial court order that a bullet be surgically removed from defend-
ant's arm). 
69. Ignoring for the moment that nobody commits crime in a Utopia. 
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Assuming that these searches were unlawful,70 conventional wis-
dom suggests thatA's rights were violated more than the others since 
only he suffered a criminal conviction by virtue of the search. 71 Yet 
B's and C's legitimate privacy interests were more seriously intruded 
upon. B had a fourth (and probably a first) amendment72 right to 
keep his opinion of the principal to himself. His belief that the prin-
cipal's prying eyes would not see his crude, but arguably cute, carica-
ture is a reasonable one which ought to be protected.73 Similarly, 
C's hanging his mother's picture in his locker (though along with 
apple pie and the flag, the paradigmatic affirmation of true-blue 
American values) could be a source of embarrassment if made 
known to the public. 
Let us now vary the hypothetical. Assume that instead of search-
ing the three lockers, X decides to confirm his suspicions by having a 
marijuana-sniffing dog sniff the three lockers. The dog determines 
that marijuana is present in A's locker, but is not present in either 
B's or C's locker. X then goes before a magistrate, who issues a 
search warrant to search A's locker for marijuana, which of course is 
found. 
In this situation, neither B nor C has had his fourth amendment 
rights violated. Neither's privacy has been invaded. They have not 
been compelled to share secrets with others. The government has 
learned nothing about them except that they do not possess mari-
juana. Any interest they may have in keeping the authorities from 
learning of their innocence is surely too trivial to protect. 
Have A's rights been violated?74 He would of course like to keep 
70. In the hypothetical there was no probable cause. Assuming that school officials do not 
have a special privilege to search under the doctrine ofin loco parentis, that students enjoy full 
fourth amendment protection (cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the 
cruel and unusual punishments clause does not apply to corporal punishment in the public 
schools)), and that the principal is considered a state official (making the search state action), 
then the search would be unconstitutional. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the 
validity of these assumptions. For a thorough discussion of searches in public schools, see 
Buss, 17ze Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739 
(1974); Gardner, Sn!ffing for Drugs in the Classroom - Perspectives on Fourth Amendment 
Scope, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 803 (1980). 
71. Cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-67 (1959) (upholding warrantless administra-
tive search because it was not aimed at a criminal prosecution). Although Frank was over-
ruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the overruling opinion emphasized 
the potential criminal liability that could result from an administrative search. 387 U.S. at 531. 
72. q. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (holding that handbiller's right to anonym-
ity is protected by the first amendment). 
73. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the fourth amendment 
protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when he enters a public phone 
booth, closes the door, and places a private call). 
74. Courts have usually, but not always, upheld the constitutionality of random dog-sniffs. 
Compare People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977) (random dog-sniffs 
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to himself the evidence of his crime. But his claim is not a powerful 
one. Indeed, in this case, an accurate dog75 approaches the hypo-
thetical divining rod by separating the innocent from the guilty. 
Many students and colleagues with whom I have discussed the 
divining rod theory have objected to it because of its "1984" over-
tones.76 There is a major difference, however, between "Big 
Brother"77 watching everything and government being able to detect 
only evidence of crime. 
I am not contending that any use of any device that in some ways 
resembles a divining rod is per se reasonable. For example, so in-
nocuous a device as a magnetometer cannot distinguish permissible 
metals (coins, keys, etc.) from impermissible ones (guns, knives, 
etc.).78 Furthermore, most magnetometers, such as the one in the 
United States Supreme Court Building, require that innocent people 
be herded like cattle and marched single file through the device. On 
the other hand, if a device could be invented that accurately detected 
weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there 
could be no fourth amendment objection to its use.79 
Nor do I suggest carte blanche use of marijuana-sniffing dogs. 
To the extent that the dog is less than perfectly accurate, innocent 
people run the risk of being searched.80 Additionally, the very act of 
constitute unreasonable search), with United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (ran-
dom dog-sniff of baggage in airline warehouse does not constitute a search). 
75. Obviously an inaccurate dog would present different problems. See Doe v. Renfrow, 
475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1919),mod!fied, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
1022 (1981). See note 80 infra. 
16. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1st Am. ed. 1949). 
11. Id. 
78. Indeed, so innocent a person as the author of this Article was compelled to empty from 
his pockets metal-framed glasses, coins and keys in full view of his students after activating the 
magnetometer at the United States Supreme Court. 
79. This is not to say the use of a magnetometer is impermissible; rather, that it is only 
permissible when the interest in using it outweighs the offensiveness of the instrusion involved. 
Those that object to the use of a magnetometer point out that there is a substantial intrusion 
because they are herded like cattle through the chute. In United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 
799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974), it was held that the use of a magnetometer in the airport boarding 
procedure constituted a search but was reasonable under the circumstances given the minimal 
intrusion and the serious danger of airline hijacking. In People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 165-
66, 524 P.2d 830, 834-35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362-63 (1974), the predeparture screening was 
justified by analogy to administrative searches. The search of one attempting to board a plane 
in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), was justified on the theory that the 
search was a condition to boarding that did not unreasonably burden the right to travel, and 
therefore, by presenting himself at the boarding gate the passenger essentially consented to the 
search. For an excellent analysis of the Davis-type rationale, see Andrews, Screening Travelers 
at the Airport to Prevent Hijacking: A New Challenge far the Unconstitutional Conditions Doc-
trine, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 657 (1974). See also Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the Anll-
H(jacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 123 (1973). 
80. For example, in Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), a drug-sniffing 
dog had "alerted" to a 13-year-old junior high school girl during a school-wide "sniff" of all 
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being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may be offen-
sive at best or harrowing at worst to the innocent sniffee.81 
Another concern expressed about marijuana-sniffing dogs (and 
presumably other divining rods) is Professor Gardner's contention 
that·people have a right to be free from unwarranted suspicion.82 
Thus, in our hypothetical locker search, A, B, and C could all argue 
that they had the right to be free from unwarranted suspicion. B and 
C, however, were benefited by the dog (divining rod) because it was 
the dog that freed them from the unwarranted suspicion which 
otherwise would have continued in the principal's mind.83 
Student A might have an argument that he, along with students 
B and C: was singled out for special treatment. If he could intro-
duce additional factors, for example, that half of the students were 
believed to have marijuana in their lockers and that A, B, and C 
were the only blacks in an otherwise all-white school, he might have 
a serious constitutional contention. 84 Apart from this equal protec-
tion problem, however, there is no constitutional basis for holding 
that a person has a right to be free from unjustifiable suspicion. 85 
the students. The dog continued to "alert" to her even after she emptied her pockets. Diane 
Doe was then subjected to a nude search by two women who examined her clothing and lifted 
her hair to look for drugs. No drugs were found but it was later discovered that she had been 
playing that morning with her dog, which was in heat. 475 F. Supp. at 1017. 
To further highlight the inaccuracy of these particular dogs, they "alerted" to some fifty 
students, only seventeen of whom were found to be in possession of drugs. 475 F. Supp. at 
1017. 
81. In Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1017, the Highland Town School District Board, 
the Superintendent of Schools (Omer Renfrow), members of the Highland Police Department 
and Patricia Little ( owner of a dog training school) devised a plan to combat what they feared 
was a growing drug problem in the Highland Junior and Senior High Schools wherein all 
2,780 students were required to remain seated at their desks while a dog sniffed at them as the 
dog and his trainer walked up and down the aisles. 475 F. Supp. at 1015-17. Thus approxi-
mately 2,763 innocent students were subjected to this potentially frightening and definitely 
degrading experience, and some 33 students were wrongly suspected of possessing contraband 
by the dogs' false alerts. 
82. Gardner, supra note 70, at 844-47. 
83. See text at notes 133-35 in.fra. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4293, 4297 (U.S. Mar. 
23, 1983) (Plurality opinion per White, J.): 
If it [a dog sni.ll] had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily 
detained while this investigative procedure was carried out. Indeed, it may be that no 
detention at all would have been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer in 
short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest on probable 
cause. 
84. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
85. Gardner cites no authority to support a constitutional basis for "the right to be free 
from unjust suspicion." Furthermore, if there were such a rule, neither the principal nor the 
police could ask questions about students suspected of criminal activity as long as there were 
no probable cause (or at least no reasonable suspicion) for arrest or search. The result would 
be a catch-22 in which police could not search because they did not have probable cause and 
could not investigate in order to establish probable cause because suspicion would thereby be 
cast on the individual unjustly. 
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Indeed, as noted, the beauty of the canine sniff is the ability to free 
one from unjustifiable suspicion. 86 
In sum, the fourth amendment exists to protect the innocent and 
may normally be invoked by the guilty only when necessary to pro-
tect the innocent. 
Ill. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
AND THE INNOCENT 
Unless the government's method of seeking or obtaining evidence 
contravenes a reasonable expectation of privacy, the usual require-
ments of probable cause and a warrant are unnecessary because 
there is no search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. 87 So long as reasonable expectation of privacy means 
86. A final objection to the divining rod theory is that ifwe had a device that would detect 
evidence of crimes whenever it existed, it would possibly precipitate enforcement of laws that 
we do not really want enforced. The following quote by Thurman W. Arnold expresses the 
idea sharply: "Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections to 
established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, 
and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals." Arnold, Law E,!forcemenl - An 
Allempl al Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. I, 14 (1932). Arguably certain drug laws (e.g., 
possession of marijuana) are examples of such laws. If so, the better course of action is for the 
legislatures and perhaps the courts to rethink the propriety of marijuana laws. If the employ-
ment of crime-detecting devices such as marijuana-sniffing dogs causes us to rethink that 
which we outlaw, it is an argument in favor of, and not against, such a use. 
Certain states have already reconsidered their drug laws with respect to marijuana. See, 
e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 17.12.IO0(e) (1975) (public possession of one ounce or less of marijuana 
or private possession of any amount for personal use punishable by civil fine not to exceed 
$100); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (1980) (possession ofa usable amount of marijuana 
is a civil violation punishable by fine not to exceed $200). The private possession of marijuana 
in Alaska was held to be protected (and thus legal) by that state's constitutional guarantee of 
privacy in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). For a review of state marijuana legisla• 
tion, see Bonnie, Decriminalizing the Marijuana User: A Drafter's Guide, 11 U. MICH, J. L. 
REF. 3 (1977). 
Professor White argues in response to my thesis: 
Many of those most vociferously opposed to the writs of assistance were guilty of system• 
atic violations of the customs laws; for them and their friends the objection to those writs 
was not that they interfered with the rights of innocent people, but that they permitted the 
enforcement of certain laws they regarded as evil. 
White, supra note 10, star note. Surely this does not establish that the fourth amendment was 
adopted to protect those who break unjust laws. If that were the intent, an amendment which 
forbids any unreasonable searches rather than all searches seems like an extraordinarily im-
precise implementing device. At most, Professor White's evidence suggests that some support-
ers of the fourth amendment who had engaged in criminal activity hoped to be incidental 
beneficiaries of a rule not designed for their benefit. See text at note 7 supra. 
87. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the court held that the warrantless 
bugging of a public telephone booth to overhear petitioner's conversations was a fourth 
amendment violation; 
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply 
"area" - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reacli of 
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure .... The Government's activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
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that expectation which should be accorded to an innocent person, it 
is consistent with the proposed thesis. Unfortunately, such has not 
always been the case. 88 
Although the Court did not use these precise words, the result 
and much of the rationale of Lewis v. United States89 paradigmati-
cally illustrates the reasonable expection of privacy theory protecting 
the innocent. A government agent telephoned Lewis, falsely repre-
sented his identity, and told Lewis that a mutual friend suggested 
that Lewis would supply the caller with marijuana. Pursuant to this 
representation, Lewis invited the caller to his home to purchase ma-
rijuana. Lewis was prosecuted for selling marijuana from his home 
to the government agent. 
Had the agent engaged in conduct which was likely to induce an 
otherwise innocent person to sell marijuana, Lewis could have raised 
the defense of entrapment.90 Instead the agent merely gave a predis-
posed marijuana peddler the opportunity to sell his wares. The 
In attempting to flesh out what the majority meant by ''.justifiable reliance," Justice Harlan, 
concurring, formulated what came to be considered the Katz rule: "My understanding of the 
rule that has emerged from prior decision is that there is a two fold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). (See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 91 (1968) (stating that the Katz rule pro-
tects reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy"). For a critique of the Court's post-Katz formula-
tions and applications of the Katz rule, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. Rev. 349, 383-86 (1974). 
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979), however, the Court noted that it 
might not require even a subjective expectation of privacy in certain circumstances: 
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that 
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might 
not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and 
effects. . . . In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had 
been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, 
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining 
what the scope of fourth amendment protection was. 
422 U.S. at 740 n.5. 
There have been several cases in which the Court has found no fourth amendment viola-
tion because there was no legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 
410 U.S. 19 (1973) (compelled production of handwriting exemplars upheld: no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in the physical characteristics of one's handwriting); United States 
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (compelled production of voice exemplars for identification 
purposes upheld). For a general exposition of the Katz rule, see I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE§ 2.1 (1978 & Supp. 1982). 
88. See text accompanying notes 104-27 infra. 
89. 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
90. At least if Lewis were not predisposed to sell marijuana. Under the subjective approach 
to entrapment, if the defendant himself was predisposed to commit the crime, there is no en-
trapment. The Supreme Court has endorsed the subjective approach for federal criminal uses. 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-35 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
451 (1932). Under the alternative objective approach, if the government's conduct were such 
as to entice an otherwise law-abiding hypothetical individual to commit a crime, the defense is 
available regardless of the defendant's actual predisposition. Thus, the subjective approach 
focuses on the particular defendant's state of mind while the objective approach looks to the 
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agent's role was analogous to a marijuana-sniffing dog.91 Both the 
dog and the agent could learn only that the object of their interest 
did or did not have marijuana.92 The agent in Lewis was more likely 
than the dog to find a false negative, i.e., he may have found Lewis 
or someone like him who possessed and sold marijuana to be unwill-
ing to deal with him.93 He could not, however, have found a false 
positive, i.e., a nonpossessor of marijuana who would have extended 
an invitation to purchase.94 Consequently, the government's proce-
dure in Lewis presents no risk to the innocent and was rightly 
sustained.95 
Somewhat more difficult is Lewis' companion case, Hoffa v. 
United States ,96 which upheld a conviction based on testimony by a 
government informer who, through his friendship with Hoffa, was 
able to spend several days in his company and testify to Hoffa's in-
criminating statements uttered in the informer's presence.97 The 
Court rejected Hoffa's fourth amendment claim, holding that "[t]he 
risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an in-
former or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is 
probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind 
of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."98 
Unlike Lewis, the innocent person in the Hoffa situation does run 
specific government conduct involved. See generally Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 163, 171-84 (1976). 
91. See Part II supra. 
92. One could argue that an agent is more intrusive than a dog, in that the agent may 
witness the suspect in activities other than drug sales, whereas the dog is only cognizant of the 
presence of drugs. This does not present a significant threat to the innocent. See text at notes 
96-102 i,!fra. 
93. A narcotics pusher might be unwilling to deal with a new or unfamiliar customer out of 
caution or fear of just such an undercover operation. 
94. Unless, of course, the dealer intended to "sting" the customer by taking his money and 
delivering fake goods. 
95. That is not to suggest, however, that any further search or unlawful conduct by an 
officer would be appropriate. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 25S U.S. 298, 30S-06 (1921) (an 
unreasonable search and seizure is committed when a representative of the government "by 
stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call," gains entrance to the 
house or office of a person suspected of a crime, and searches without consent). 
96. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
97. There was a question raised over whether the informer actually was a government 
planted agent or whether he was a private citizen acting on his own behalf. The district court 
found that he was not a government agent. See 38S U.S. at 299, n.4. The Supreme Court 
proceeded on the assumption that he was planted by the government. 38S U.S. at 299. 
The controversy sprang from the fact that Partin had been released on bail from prison and 
criminal proceedings against him had been postponed while he served as an informer. Fur-
thermore, after Hoffa's conviction, the charges against Partin were dropped and his wife re-
ceived four payments of $300. 385 U.S. at 297-98. 
98. 38S U.S. at 303 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
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some risk. Any innocent statement he makes may be reported to the 
police chief whether he wants the chief to hear it or not; e.g.: (1) 
"The police chief is a horse's ass"; (2) "I'm a Communist sympa-
thizer";99 or (3) "I hope the Yankees win the pennant." 100 Yet the 
Court was surely correct in holding that one must run the risk that 
any person will repeat any statement to whomever he chooses. The 
question is whether he must also run the risk that the person has 
been planted by the government. Since a person can choose his con-
fidants and knows that he is risking unauthorized repetition of his 
statements, the additional risk to an innocent person that he might 
be dealing with a government agent does not seem very great. 101 
When this minimal additional risk is balanced against the need for 
informants to help solve crime, 102 the Hoffa result seems 
defensible. 103 
99. The decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that simple association with the 
Communist Party without sharing its unlawful aims or without active advocacy of them is 
protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Noto v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
100. From my perspective, the last of these statements is especially repulsive. Probably, 
most people also would prefer not to have the first two reported to the police. 
101. There are three considerations that minimize this additional risk. First, the informant 
is unlikely to report nonincriminating statements to the police. He is, after all, employed only 
to provide evidence of crime. Second, the informant's words are not completely reliable. If 
the informant tells the police chief that the innocent suspect thinks he is a horse's ass, the 
innocent suspect can deny that he ever made the statement. Finally, the only additional risk 
that Hoffa imposes on an innocent person is that he may not know the identity of his confi-
dant's employer. The innocent person knows that he is speaking to another person. He knows 
that that person may repeat his words to others. All that he does not know is that the person's 
employer is the police, rather than, for example, IBM. This additional risk is not sufficiently 
great to justify denying police access to information about crime. 
102. The court has recognized the key role that informants play in modem crime detection. 
For example, in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the Court upheld an Illinois proce-
dure that allowed the police in a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause for arrest and 
search, to withhold the identity and address of their informant so long as they disclosed infor-
mation tending to show the basis for the informant's knowledge and the informant's record or 
reliability. 
The Court noted: 
A genuine privilege, . . . must be recognized for the identity of persons supplying ~he gov-
ernment with information concerning the commission of crimes. Communications of this 
kind ought to receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the informer's identity is 
disclosed. . . . [An informer] will usually condition his cooperation on an assurance of 
anonymity - to protect himself and his family from harm, to preclude adverse social 
reactions and to avoid the risk of defamation or malicious prosecution actions against 
him. The government also has an interest in non-disclosure of the identity of its inform-
ers. Law enforcement officers often depend upon professional informers to furnish them 
with a flow of information about criminal activities. Revelation of the dual role played by 
such persons ends their usefulness to the government and discourages others from enter-
ing into a like relationship. 
386 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, Ev1-
DENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). 
103. Other commentators reach the opposite result, arguing that people should not have to 
assume the risk that their friends are actually government agents who have promised to report 
back to the police. See, e.g., Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
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Although focusing on the interest of the guilty rather than the 
innocent did not create a bad result in Lewis and probably did not in 
Hoffa, it certainly did in United States v. White,w4 in which the 
Court sanctioned an unwarranted police installation of a transmit-
ting device hidden upon the person of a police informant. The de-
vice instantaneously transmitted White's statements, intended only 
for the informant's ears, to the police. Recordings of these state-
ments formed part of the government's case against White. 
After citing Hoffa and Lewis with approval, the Court analyzed 
the problem strictly in terms of a wrongdoer's risk: 
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accom-
plice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when 
that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which 
are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case. See Lopez v. 
United States 373 U.S. 427 (1963).!05 ••• 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk 
that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently 
doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or 
never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks 
what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of what his course will be, 
what he will or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he would 
distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and probable 
informers with transmitters on the other. . . . An electronic recording 
will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant 
has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent. It may also 
be that with the recording in existence it is less likely that the inform-
ant will change his mind, less chance that threat or injury will suppress 
unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-examination will con-
found the testimony. Considerations like these obviously do not favor 
the defendant, but we are not prepared to hold that a defendant who 
has no constitutional right to exclude the informer's unaided testimony 
nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege against a more accu-
rate version of the events in question.1°6 
From this perspective, the Court's logic is impeccable. A guilty per-
son has no legitimate interest in a less reliable version of the facts. 
Furthermore, a recording reduces the probability of erroneous in-
formant testimony being believed, thus ensuring a more accurate 
verdict. 107 Indeed, if one's focus is on the rights of the criminal, it is 
ment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133, 151-52. Another commentator argues that Hoffa totally "disre-
gard[s] ... the value of friendship as an aspect of privacy." Note, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 1013 
(1967). 
104. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
105. (This footnote is the author's.) Lopez involved a situation in which an informant 
carried a pocket tape recorder under his clothing and recorded his conversation with the 
defendant. 
106. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1963). 
107. For example, under the circumstances in Hojfa, text accompanying notes 96-98 supra, 
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hard to accept Hoffa and reject White. 108 
As applied to the innocent, however, the risk is entirely different. 
Viewing myself as a hypothetical innocent person, it is one thing for 
a third party to tell the police chief that I think he is a horse's ass or 
that I said I am a Communist sympathizer. 109 It is quite another for 
the police chief to hear it from my own mouth. 110 Furthermore, if 
the police have an unauthorized recording of my voice, they have the 
ability to use it for parlor games, practical jokes, or harassment. 111 
The justification for this intrusion upon the innocent is miniscule. 
In recent cases in which the Supreme Court has been asked to ap-
prove electronic recording or transmitting by a government agent, 
the government appears to have had probable cause, 112 but not a 
search warrant. 113 Given the intrusiveness of an electronic recording 
or transmitting device, it is hard to make a case for dispensing with 
probable cause. 114 The usual rationale for requiring a warrant is the 
unjustifiably high risk that those "engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime" 115 will assume probable cause 
where none exists. Consequently, the fourth amendment contem-
plates a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 116 The 
there probably is a greater than average possibility that Partin was lying. Therefore, if Hoffa 
were indeed innocent, a recording makes it less likely that he might be wrongfully brought to 
trial. On the other hand, if Hoffa were in fact guilty, the recording would be more accurate 
and reliable and probably would weigh more heavily with the jury than would Partin's testi-
mony. See 385 U.S. at 317-21 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
108. Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result of Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 
441 (1963), advocated permitting the use of hidden electronic devices by field agents for inter-
agency purpose - such as protecting the credibility of an IRS agent against charges of bribery 
- while prohibiting use of such recordings as evidence in criminal trials. 373 U.S. at 445-46. 
Chief Justice Warren's proposal is unacceptable because it would preclude the use of valuable 
evidence that was lawfully, not unlawfully, obtained. Only by accepting the Warren view 
could one focusing on the rights of the criminal accept Hojfa and reject White. 
109. In case any police chiefs are reading this Article, please understand these statements 
are purely hypothetical. 
110. Coming from my own mouth, the impact of the words may be greater; at the very 
least, I cannot deny that I made the statements. 
111. I assume that it will be impossible to control unauthorized use of these recordings. 
Given that they were obtained without a warrant, and suspects have no idea that the tapes 
exist, adequate controls seem unlikely. For one example of uncontrolled clandestine surveil-
lance, see D. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981). 
112. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 
323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); note 117 i'!fra. 
I 13. Of the recent cases cited in note I 12supra, only Osborn involved a situation in which 
the police did obtain a warrant before using electronic surveilance. 
114. The Supreme Court decisions have done just that. After White, the police could bug 
an informant sent by the police to talk to me - the hypothetically innocent person - and 
could record or listen in on that conversation. 
115. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
116. 333 U.S. at 14. The Court has reached some interesting results in trying to identify 
exactly who qualifies as a "neutral and detached" magistrate. Compare Shadwick v. City of 
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decision to transmit or record is seldom made instantaneously. 
Rather, it is usually the product of much deliberation. 117 Therefore, 
it seems hard to justify the absence of a warrant in cases such as 
White.us 
If the suggestions proposed in this Article had been the law when 
the government sought to transmit and record White's conversations, 
transmission and recording could have been permissible. The gov-
ernment could have presented its case to a magistrate who would 
have issued a warrant for the recording. Meanwhile, any of the rest 
of us could have expressed an opinion of the police chief, secure in 
the knowledge that his agent was not then and there recording or 
transmitting it. 
No case illustrates the lack of concern for the innocent better 
than Smith v. Maryland, 119 in which the Court held that the installa-
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (appointed municipal court clerk is neutral and detached), wit/1 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general is not sufficiently 
neutral and detached). 
117. For example, White involved a series of at least eight prearranged meetings, between 
the informant and defendant during a two-month period, for the purpose of purchasing and 
selling illegal drugs. Before each scheduled encounter, police agents, without a warrant, 
equipped the informant with a hidden microphone and transmitter. See United States v. 
White, 405 F.2d 838, 840-42 (7th Cir. 1969) (recitation of facts by Court of Appeals), In fact, 
the Court of Appeals specifically noted that "the Government did not argue that the evidence 
would have been lost due to the delay of obtaining a warrant, nor do the facts suggest that such 
an argument could have been made." 405 F.2d at 844 n.6. 
In Lopez, the defendant innkeeper was convicted of attempting to bribe an IRS agent who 
was investigating possible evasion of a cabaret tax. After a series of preliminary meetings, 
Lopez offered the agent $420 cash plus indefinite future benefits to drop the investigation. 
Another meeting was then scheduled for three days later. After the agent reported the at-
tempted bribe and turned over the money to his superiors, he was equipped with both a tape 
recorder and a transmitter before the next meeting at which further bribery payments were 
made. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 428-32 (1963). Here again, no warrant for the 
bugging was obtained despite the fact that the IRS agents had three days' prior notice of the 
meeting. 
Osborn involved a conviction of Jimmy Hoffa's attorney for attempted jury tampering. In 
that case, informant Robert Vick met several times with federal agents, indicated he intended 
to apply for a job with Hoffa's attorney, and agreed to report any illegal activities'he observed. 
Vick then got a job investigating the backgrounds of potential jurors in the Hoffa case. After 
the attorney discovered that Vick's cousin was in the jury pool, preliminary discussions about a 
bribe were held. Only then did Vick tell federal agents. In this case, unlike While and Lopez, 
the agents did obtain a warrant before concealing a tape recorder on Vick to record further 
discussions of the possible bribe. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 325-29 (1966). 
118. At one time, it might have been doubtful that a warrant would have been issued for 
electronic surveillance, but that is no longer true. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) (recognizing that agents might well have had probable cause to eavesdrop, but reversing 
conviction because no prior warrant obtained); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) 
(invalidating as overbroad a New York statute providing for sweeping warrants to eavesdrop, 
but recognizing that "this Court has in the past, under specific conditions and circumstances, 
sustained the use of eavesdropping devices"); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) 
(upholding electronic surveillance when carried out pursuant to narrowly drawn warrant). 
119. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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tion of a pen register120 on an individual's telephone was not a 
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Consequently, 
government officials are perfectly free to learn every telephone 
number that any persons dials, subject only to the cooperation of the 
telephone company.121 
Three Justices - Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan - dissented 
because of the intolerable impact of this practice on the innocent. 122 
Justice Stewart (whose unfortunate majority vote in White helped 
establish the underpinning for Smith) noted: 
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed 
in a publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who 
would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or 
long distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list 
might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal 
the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the 
most intimate details of a person's life. 123 
Even more pointedly, Justice Marshall observed: 
Privacy in placing calls is of value not only to those engaged in crimi-
120. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone 
by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It 
does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually com-
pleted." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.l (1977). See generally 
Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108 (1970); Note, The Legal Constraints upon 
the Use of the Pen Register as a Law E,iforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028 (1975). 
121. The telephone company probably can be compelled to cooperate. q. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), in which the Court upheld the subpoena of microfilm records held 
by defendant's bank. Defendant was convicted on various charges relating to the operation of 
an illegal still. In upholding the conviction, the court held that an individual has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in records of his financial transactions kept by a bank as required by 
federal law: 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit slips, rather than to the 
microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, we perceive no 
legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not confidential 
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of 
the documents obtained ... contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks 
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. . . . The depositor 
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the Government. 
'425 U.S. at 442-43 (citation omitted). 
The M11ler decision rested heavily on the court's prior decision in California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). In Shultz the Court held that the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), consti-
tuted a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce 
and did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the banks. At that time, however, the 
Court refused to rule on whether the fourth amendment rights of individual depositors were 
abridged because none of the individual plaintiffs in that case had standing. 416 U.S. at 59-70. 
Taken together, Miller and Shultz make it clear that the federal government can, on the 
one hand, compel the maintenance of business records by banks and, on the other hand, avoid 
any fourth amendment problem by subpoenaing the records from the bank rather than from 
the individual himself. 
122. Justices Stewart and Marshall each filed a dissent. Justice Brennan joined each one. 
123. 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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nal activity. The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring 
will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to 
hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political or-
ganizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately 
wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts. 124 
Perhaps the reason that views such as these125 are not taken seri-
ously is the nature of the cases; White involved a drug peddler, while 
Smith involved a robber who continued to harass his victim by 
threatening and obscene phone calls. Furthermore, the police may 
have had probable cause to believe that Smith was making the 
phone call. 126 Consequently, the Court may have viewed the danger 
to the innocent as irrelevant to the case before it. Yet so long as 
fourth amendment standards are forged in cases involving not very 
nice people, the Court must be concerned about the negative impact 
its decisions have on those of us who are nice. 127 
124. 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
125. The dissents of Justices Stewart and Marshall in Smith echo the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Harlan in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, Harlan emphasized 
that a rule requiring a warrant for electronic surveillance would be aimed at protecting the 
innocent, not the guilty: 
By casting its "risk analysis" solely in terms of the expectation and risks that "wrongdo-
ers" or "one contemplating illegal activities" ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think, 
misses the mark entirely. On Lee does not simply mandate that criminals must daily run 
the risk of unknown eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it subjects each and 
every law-abiding member of society to that risk. . . . Abolition of On Lee would not end 
electronic eavesdropping. It would prevent public officials from engaging in that practice 
unless they first had probable cause . . . and had tested their version of the facts before a 
detached judicial officer. The interest On Lee fails to protect is the expectation of the 
ordinary citizen, who has never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may carry on 
his private discourse freely, openly, and spontaneously without measuring his every word 
against the connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by others unknown to 
him and unfamiliar with his situation or analyzed in a cold, formal record played days, 
months, or years after the conversation. Interposition of a warrant requirement is 
designed not to shield "wrongdoers," but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of 
personal security through our society. 
401 U.S. at 789-90. (In On Lee v. United Stales, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), decided under trespass 
doctrine, the Court held that the fourth amendment was inapplicable where an informer that 
was "bugged" transmitted a conversation with a suspect to an agent who subsequently testified 
to statements made.) For one example of uncontrolled clandestine surveillance, see D. GAR• 
ROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981). 
126. The Court stated the facts as follows: 
On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough was robbed. She gave the 
police a description of the robber and of a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile she had ob-
served near the scene of the crime. After the robbery, McDonough began receiving 
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. On 
one occasion, the caller asked that she step out on her front porch; she did so, and saw the 
1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier described to police moving slowly past her home. On 
March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough's description dnving a 1975 Monte 
Carlo in her neighborhood. By tracing the license plate number, police learned that the 
car was registered in the name of the petitioner, Michael Lee Smith. 
442 U.S. at 737(citations omitted). On the basis of these facts, police had the telephone com-
pany install a pen register to monitor Smith's home phone. 
127. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), 
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IV. CONSENT AND THE INNOCENT PERSON 
Consent searches are another area in which analysis has been di-
rected principally to the impact on the guilty rather than the inno-
cent. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 128 the issue was whether a valid 
consent presupposed that the searchee had knowledge of the right to 
withhold consent. In holding that such knowledge was not required, 
the Court obviously was concerned with the impact of such a rule on 
the guilty: "Any defendant who was the subject of a search author-
ized solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction 
into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify 
that he in fact knew he could refuse to consent." 129 
In Bustamonte, six men were driving down the highway with a 
burned-out headlight and license plate light at 1:30 a.m. A police-
man stopped the car, and after only one of the six occupants pro-
duced identification, asked all six to leave the car. Subsequently two 
reinforcements arrived. Only then did the policemen "ask" for and 
receive permission to search the car. 
Let us hypothesize innocent people (disregarding traffic viola-
tions) in this situation. Six people have been stopped, asked (or-
dered?) to leave the car, seen two reinforcement police cars arrive, 
and then "asked" if the police may search their car. Surely, most 
people in that situation would believe that not allowing the search 
would create more problems than allowing it, assuming (which is not 
likely) that they even believe they have a choice. Yet the search may 
tum out to be destructive, 130 time-consuming, or both. The real 
recognized the danger of allowing constitutional doctrines to be shaped by emotional reactions 
to particular unsympathetic defendants: 
The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience. But petty cases 
are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact of a sordid little case is apt to 
obscure the implication of the generalization of which the case gives rise. . . . It is a fair 
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in 
controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a 
shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great 
themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment. 
339 U.S. at 68-69 (Frankfurther, J., dissenting). 
In Smith and White, the police may have had probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant. 
If the Court felt compelled to uphold the search in those cases, it would have been better to 
formulate a rule allowing introduction of seized evidence where there is probable cause but no 
warrant than to characterize the intrusion as not a search at all. At least, such an approach 
would not validate such intrusions without probable cause. This approach would require cre-
ating another exception to the warrant requirement - an exception that would be hard to 
formulate. q. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (warrantless search of automobile 
allowed when officers had probable cause to believe contraband concealed somewhere in car). 
128. 412 U.S. at 218 (1973). 
129. 412 U.S. at 230. That danger arises, of course, only if one assumes it would be im-
practicable simply to tell the individual that he has the right to refuse. 
130. In Bustamonte, the rear seat apparently was removed to search beneath it. See also 
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question is the justification for saddling innocent people with that 
choice. 
In Bustamonte, the Court spoke of the need for consent searches: 
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, 
but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a 
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and relia-
ble evidence. In the present case for example, while the police had 
reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend 
that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search 
was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the search 
yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and 
provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime, 
were not mistakenly brought to trial. 131 
The implication of this rhetoric is that the the police must have a 
method to legitimate a search without probable cause lest valuable 
evidence be lost and innocent people wrongly accused. If we could 
take this seriously, we ought to allow searches based on less than 
probable cause - perhaps reasonable, or even unreasonable, suspi-
cion could be the standard. We don't allow such searches, however, 
because probable cause has been determined to be an appropriate 
balance between the government's need to obtain evidence and the 
innocent person's right to be free from an intrusive search. 132 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (prohibition agents destroyed rear seat cushion 
and upholstery during search of automobile for illegal liquor); Martinez v. United States, 333 
F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964) (illegal drugs found and removed from automobile air vents). 
It should be noted also that an individual might not be able to withdraw his consent once it 
is given, even though the search becomes destructive. See, e.g, People v. Kennard, 175 Colo. 
479,488 P.2d 563 (1971) (once given, consent cannot be withdrawn); Smith v. Commonwealth, 
197 Ky. 192,246 S.W. 449 (1923) (same); Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal qfier Miranda 
v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rev. 130, 157 & n.121 (1967). Cf. United States v. DeAngelo, 584 
F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978) (once defendant presented himself for boarding and subjected his brief-
case to X-ray search, he could not then withdraw "consent" and terminate search by choosing 
not to take flight). 
Other authorities maintain that a consent to search can be revoked at any time. See, e.g., 
Masson v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. 
Pa. 1975); 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 8.1 at 633-35 (1978). See also Model Code 
of Prearraignment Procedure§ 240.3(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1975). Cf. United States v. 
Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (limitations on scope of search may be made at any time). 
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this question. 
131. 412 U.S. at 227-28 (footnote omitted). 
132. Despite the vast number of cases that have addressed the issue of whether probable 
cause to search existed, it is difficult to formulate a concrete rule to govern individual situa-
tions. As the court in United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972) noted: "It is a 
plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 
458 F.2d at 821 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has dealt with a number of representative situations; those cases 
offer some guidance in determining whether probable cause exists. 
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), defendant was convicted of illegally 
importing liquor into Oklahoma. Defendant claimed that liquor found during a search of his 
car was inadmissible because the police had no probable cause to search. The Court found 
probable cause based on information within the personal knowledge of the officer: (I) the 
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From the perspective of the innocent, the Court in Bustamonte 
noted that "a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably 
less inconvenience for the subject of the search . . . ." 133 Such a 
situation could occur when an individual is stopped by the police 
because his vehicle meets a generalized description of a vehicle be-
lieved to contain contraband. For example, if a policeman has infor-
mation that a large yellow truck is carrying one hundred pounds of 
marijuana over a particular highway, he may be justified in stopping 
a yellow truck and questioning its driver. 134 Assuming, however, 
arresting officer had arrested defendant five months earlier for illegally transporting liquor, (2) 
the officer had seen the defendant loading liquor into his car at least twice during the prior six 
months, (3) at the time of the arrest and search, defendant's car appeared to be "heavily 
loaded," (4) the defendant was traveling along a known bootlegging route, and (5) when pur-
sued by the police car, defendant increased his speed and tried to outrun the officer. 
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), the Court held that probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant may be established by hearsay evidence, provided the affiant recites 
specific underlying circumstance showing the hearsay is reliable. 
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), defendant's conviction on interstate gam-
bling charges was overturned on grounds that the FBI's search warrant was issued without 
probable cause. In Spinelli, the FBI had relied on a tip from "a confidential reliable inform-
ant" that defendant was accepting wagers by telephone in the apartment sought to be searched. 
393 U.S. at 422 (appendix to opinion of the Court). The Court found that "[though] the affiant 
swore that his confidant was 'reliable,' he offered the magistrate no reason in support of his 
conclusion." 393 U.S. at 416. 
In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), the Court ruled that when an informant's 
tip specified that the informant had himself purchased bootleg liquor from defendant, the tip 
did demonstrate a sufficient basis for the informant's knowledge. Furthermore, the tax investi-
gator's own knowledge of defendant's background as a bootlegger, together with the fact that 
the tip was a declaration against the informant's penal interest, provided sufficient reason to 
think the informant was truthful. 403 U.S. at 579-80. 
133. 412 U.S. at 228. 
134. Under Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), a police officer must have "at least 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not 
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation 
of law" before he may stop an individual automobile. 440 U.S. at 663. Very little has been 
settled, however, as to what constitutes "reasonable suspicion." The Supreme Court has held 
that "application of [a Texas Penal statute] to detain appellant and require him to identify 
himself to police officers violated the fourth amendment because the officers lacked any rea-
sonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct." 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). In Brown, the officer had testified that the situation 
wherein defendant was walking away from another in an alley known to be frequented by 
drug traffickers " 'looked suspicious,' but he was unable to point to any facts supporting that 
conclusion." 443 U.S. at 52. 
See also People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978): 
"'(R]easonable suspicion' has been aptly defined as 'the quantum of knowledge sufficient to 
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that crimi-
nal activity is at hand .... The requisite knowledge must be more than subjective; it should 
have at least some demonstrable roots. Mere 'hunch' or 'gut reaction' will not do." In 
Sohotker, the court found no reasonable suspicion when police stopped defendants' car after 
the occupants had slowed down and glanced at a bar while driving in a high-crime neighbor-
hood. q. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams, a police officer, acting on a tip 
from an informant that he knew personally and who had provided information previously, 
conducted a search. The Court held that when an officer makes a reasonable investigatory 
stop he may conduct a limited, protective search for weapons when he has reason to believe 
the suspect is armed and dangerous. 
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that this information does not amount to probable cause, the police-
man could not search the truck without the driver's consent. Under 
these circumstances, it may well be in the driver's best interest to 
consent to the search and remove the suspicion which the policeman 
would otherwise have about him. Certainly there is nothing in the 
fourth amendment designed to discourage citizens from aiding 
police. 135 
The Bustamonte rule of no notice to the searchee of his right to 
refuse consent is not necessary in this situation. The truck driver 
should be informed that he may or may not consent as he sees fit. If 
he does not consent, he will be suspect and watched very closely. If 
he does consent and no marijuana is found, he will no longer be 
under suspicion. Under these circumstances, many, if not most, in-
nocent drivers would consent. Moreover, they would not feel that 
they have been bullied by the police. Those who did not consent 
would simply be exercising their right to refuse to be searched even 
at the cost of remaining a suspect, a right which is at the core of the 
fourth amendment.136 
A guilty person, ie., one with marijuana, almost certainly would 
turn down the invitation to have his truck searched. But the police 
are not powerless. They could follow him, take his license number, 
and radio for more information about him through other channels. 
Indeed, this might ultimately lead to probable cause, at which point 
he could be stopped and searched. 137 If not, he would receive no 
more benefit than the fourth amendment allows him. 
One senses that the Court in Bustamonte viewed convicting Bus-
tamente as more important than taking the fourth amendment seri-
135. "[I]t is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals." 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 243 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,488 (1971)). 
136. This search should be distinguished from the dog-sniffing discussed in Part II, stpra, 
because of its potential impact on the innocent. Neither student B nor C may "refuse to be 
searched even at the cost of remaining a suspect" because the sniff will reveal on{1• evidence of 
crime. In contrast, the consent search of the car will reveal all of the contents of the car, 
whether criminal or not. 
137. For example, in the recent case of United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), police 
received an informant's tip that a man called "Bandit" was selling narcotics kept in the truck 
of a maroon-colored Chevrolet Malibu on Ridge Street in the District of Columbia. The in-
formant gave a detailed description of the man involved. Police officers then drove to the 
neighborhood and spotted a maroon Malibu parked at 439 Ridge Street. Before approaching 
the car or looking for the driver, they radioed police headquarters and found that the car was 
owned by a man who fit the description and who sometimes went by the alias "Bandit." When 
the officers saw a man fitting the description drive the car away, they stopped him and 
searched the car. The court held that by verifying the informant's tip via the radio call, the 
police had established probable cause to stop and search the car. 
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ously. 138 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an earlier case put it 
even more starkly: 
While it may not be "in accord with common experience" for a 
guilty person to consent to a search which, if successful, may help to 
prove his guilt, it may nevertheless occur. Happily, not all criminals 
are highly intelligent and use the most effective tactics in their contacts 
with the police. Again happily, sometimes their contacts with the po-
lice confuse them, and they say and do things which, after deliberation, 
they regret. To whatever extent stupidity or confusion on the part of 
the guilty person contributes to the prompt acquisition by the police of 
evidence of crime, so that the police can get back to work on the nu-
merous cases which may remain unsolved, society is the gainer and 
nobody is the loser of anything to which he is constitutionally 
entitled. 139 
The complete answer to this is contained in a single sentence of Esco-
bedo v. Illinois: "If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart 
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is some-
thing very wrong with that system." 140 Even more significantly, the 
innocent should not be placed in a position where they feel obliged 
to consent so that the guilty are more likely to "voluntarily" allow 
the police to find evidence. 
The threat to the innocent posed by Bustamonte is mild com-
pared to the most pernicious of its progeny, United States v. Menden-
hall 141 While changing planes in Detroit, Sylvia Mendenhall, a 
twenty-two-year-old black woman who matched the "drug courier 
profile," 142 was stopped and questioned by Agent Anderson of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.). Without probable cause, 143 
138. It should be noted that Bustamante attacked his state court conviction by a petition 
for habeas corpus in federal district court. Four Justices would have denied the petition on the 
ground that principles of finality preclude raising a fourth amendment claim via habeas 
corpus. 412 U.S. at 250-75 (Powell, J., concurring) (joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehniquist, J.) 
and 412 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justice Blackmun said he refrained from join-
ing the concurrence of Justice Powell because it was not necessary to determine the habeas 
corpus/finality issue in deciding the case.). Three years after Bustamonte, the Supreme Court 
held that the legality of a search or seizure could not be raised via habeas corpus so long as the 
state courts had fully and fairly adjudicated the fourth amendment claim. Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976). Thus, the Court may have allowed its view on finality or judicial economy to 
influence its approach to the fourth amendment question. 
139. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405,407 (9th Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)). 
140. 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). 
141. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
142. The profile is "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of 
persons carrying illicit drugs." Mendenhall fit the profile in at least four respects: she (I) came 
to Detroit from Los Angeles, a major source for heroin brought to Detroit; (2) was the last 
person off the plane, acted nervous, and carefully scanned the whole area where the agents 
stood; (3) did not have any baggage checked through to Detroit; and (4) purchased a return 
ticket on a different airline. 446 U.S. at 547 n.l. 
143. It is perhaps arguable that simply matching the drug courier profile might establish 
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Anderson asked Mendenhall to accompany him to the D.E.A. office, 
a request to which she acquiesced. While in the D.E.A. office, An-
derson asked her for permission to search her handbag and her per-
son, informing her that she could decline. After the handbag search 
proved fruitless, a policewoman who ascertained that Mendenhall 
consented to be searched informed her for the the first time that the 
search was to be a strip search. In response to Mendenhall's protest 
that she had a plane to catch, the policewoman told her that if no 
narcotics were found she could catch the plane. At that point, Men-
denhall unbuttoned her clothing, reached into her undergarments, 
and "voluntarily" handed the heroin to the police. The Court up-
held this "consent" search. 144 
Let us posit an innocent person in Mendenhall's situation. A 
twenty-two-year-old black woman is asked by an older white male 
D.E.A. agent to accompany him to the agency office. Given that 
Mendenhall, who had drugs, acquiesced, it seems unlikely that the 
one without drugs would refuse to go. 145 If Mendenhall had ref used, 
probable cause to search or at least reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual. 
The enforcement system using courier profiles boasts impressive figures for accuracy. The 
Court in Mendenhall noted that during the first eighteen months of the program in Detroit, 77 
of 96 encounters uncovered controlled substances; 122 of 141 persons intercepted were ar-
rested. 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring). The issue of whether this accuracy percentage 
established probable cause was not raised in Mendenhall, however. Instead, the government 
never contended it had probable cause to search, and each court assumed that probable cause 
did not exist. 
Despite its percentage accuracy, the profile does not alone establish probable cause. For 
example, if it were demonstrated that eighty percent of all dormitory rooms at a certain univer-
sity contained illegal drugs of some type, there ought not to be probable cause to search them 
all. For a critical look at the use of drug courier profiles, see J. CHOPER. Y. KAMISAR & L. 
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPEMENTS 1979-1980, 134-35 (1981); Note, 
United States v. Mendenhall: DEA Airport Search and Seizure, 16 NEW ENG, L. REV. 597 
(1981). See also note 147 infta. 
144. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that the initial stop for questioning in the 
airport concourse did not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
because a "reasonable person" would have thought she was free to leave. This view was es-
poused notwithstanding the D.E.A. agent's testimony that she would not have been allowed to 
leave had she requested to do so. Since the initial stop was not viewed as a seizure, and since 
the subsequent consent to search was deemed voluntary, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist held 
the seized narcotics admissible. 
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger assumed that the initial stop did con-
stitute a seizure but held that the agents had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: there-
fore the stop for routine questioning was justified. Then, because she "consented" to further 
questions and a search, the evidence was admissible. 
The four dissenters - Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens - thought that the 
initial stop was a seizure and that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify it. In any event, 
the government did not carry its burden of proving that defendant's consent to further ques-
tioning and to a search was voluntary. Therefore, the search was tainted and the seized evi-
dence should have been excluded. 
The recent case of Florida v. Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4293 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1983), again pro-
duced a badly splintered Court on a similar, though not identical, fact pattern. 
145. See the discussion of the pressures inherent to any police-citizen encounter in J. 
CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 140-41. 
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Agent Anderson testified that he would have forcibly detained 
her. 146 Once there, would the innocent person "voluntarily consent" 
to the strip search? If she wanted to catch the plane, she would. Of-
ficer Anderson testified that although Mendenhall did not have to 
consent to the search, he would not have released her until she 
did.141 
Why must innocent people be subjected to this? Justice Powell is 
surely correct in noting that "[t]he jurisprudence of the Fourth 
Amendment demands consideration of the public's interest in effec-
tive law enforcement as well as each person's constitutionally se-
cured right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 148 
Just as surely, that is the function of "probable cause." 149 When the 
D.E.A. agent has probable cause, he can stop and search a citizen. 150 
If the citizen is innocent, his inconvenience and humiliations are part 
of the price he pays for living in an ordered society. When the police 
lack probable cause, the price is too high, and a properly construed 
fourth amendment should forbid it. 
V. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
One could argue that the Court's growing distaste for the exclu-
sionary rule151 has contributed to the results of many of the cases 
criticized in this Article. When drug pushers (Mendenhall, White), 
robbers (Smith), and other thieves (Bustamonte) are caught red-
146. 446 U.S. at 575 n.12 (White, J., dissenting). 
147. 446 U.S. at 575 n.13. In United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 
1976), ajfd., 556 F.2d '385 (6th Cir. 1977), the court reviewed the consent statistics for the 
D.E.A. drug courier enforcement program: 
Of the 77 searches in which illegal drugs were found, the agents identified 26 consent 
searches. Forty-three searches were non-consensual. [The court does not explain the situ-
ation in the other eight searches.] Illegal contraband was seized in all cases in which 
consent was not given and a search was made. In 15 to 25 consent searches, agents did not 
uncover any contraband drugs. 
409 F. Supp. at 539. 
148. 446 U.S. at 565. 
149. See note 132 supra. 
150. Compare United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, in which the defendant met 
the drug courier profile, used an alias, had been arrested once before for possession of heroin, 
and was currently renting an apartment (aside from his residence) which was under surveil-
lance by the Detroit police for alleged narcotics traffic (probable cause), with United States v. 
Hughes, (decided with Van Lewis) in which defendant "looked like" a person previously con-
victed of possession of four pounds of heroin, walked fast through the airport, claimed no 
luggage and looked nervous, and whose driver's license and airline ticket bore different names 
(no probable cause). 
151. The doctrine that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmis-
sible in a criminal prosecution is known as the "exclusionary rule." See, e.g., Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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handed, it is difficult to applaud decisions that turn them loose.1 52 
Given that these criminals are only incidental beneficiaries of a rule 
designed to protect the innocent, 153 would it be wise to jettison the 
exclusionary rule in favor of suits by the innocent, who are, after all, 
the intended beneficiaries of the fourth amendment? Although the 
solution has been suggested, 154 it would almost certainly be detri-
mental to the innocent. 
While one is tempted to blame the exclusionary rule for cases 
like White, Smith, Bustamonte, and Mendenhall, all four cases were 
in fact decided on the ground that the fourth amendment was fol-
lowed, not that the exclusionary rule was an inappropriate remedy 
for its violation. Furthermore, innocent people would not have 
been adequate plaintiffs in those cases. An innocent person whose 
conversation was transmitted or whose telephone calls were recorded 
by a pen register would probably never learn of the violation. 155 An 
innocent person who consented to a search would be unlikely to sue 
because of the same desire for noninvolvement that caused him to 
consent in the first place. Furthermore, one who had consented 
would be in a poor position to seek substantial damages even if the 
consent did not constitute a waiver. 156 
More generally, one could argue that the exclusionary rule, 
which directly aids only the guilty, is a poor means of enforcing a 
right designed to benefit the innocent. 157 It has been attacked as dis-
proportionately costly, 158 inferior to other remedies,159 and incapa-
152. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: lf'hy Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA• 
TURE 214, 218-20 ()978). 
153. See parts I & II supra. 
154. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 420-24 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
155. Of course, the innocent person might learn of the violation if police used the informa-
tion extra judicially. For example, police might use a tape of the innocent person's conversa-
tion to harass him, or to play a joke. 
156. See, e.g., Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives lo tlte Ex-
clusionary Rule, 69 GEO. LJ. 1361, 1388-89 (1981) (claimant must risk reprisal by police;juries 
historically have sided with police). In addition, even if a jury decides in favor of the innocent 
victim, damages may be so minimal as to discourage legal action by innocent persons, Con-
. sider a hypothetical based on the facts ofBuslamonle,see text at notes 121-139supra, Suppose 
Bustamonte had been innocent, and the search of the car turned up nothing. To what would 
he be entitled? Damages based on the annoyance of a squeaky back seat in the car of which he 
has use, resulting from the police search under the seat? See Mertens & Wasserstrom, Tlte 
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating tlte Police and Derailing 1/1e Law, 
70 GEO. LJ. 365, 407-08 (1981). 
151. See, e.g., Wilkey, supra note 152, at 228. 
158. E.g, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 418-20 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
159. E.g., 403 U.S. at 421-24 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Wilkey, supra note 152, at 227-32; 
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ble of enforcing an innocent person's rights. 160 None of these attacks 
has enough merit to warrant discarding the rule. 
An elegant, albeit inaccurate, statement of the exclusionary rule's 
high cost is Judge Cardozo's oft-quoted bon mot: "the criminal is to 
go free because the constable has blundered." 161 More than a dec-
ade ago, I described its inaccuracy: 
When the police make an exploratory search without probable cause, it 
is indeed true that under the exclusionary rule any evidence they may 
find will be excluded and that the criminal will go free if there is no 
other evidence. . . . If [however] the police had not "blundered" by 
committing the unreasonable search, the criminal never would have 
been brought to trial in the first place since there would have been no 
evidence to justify it. Therefore, in these instances the criminal does 
not go free because the constable had blundered, but because he would 
have gone free if the constable had not blundered. 162 
Even when the criminal does go free because of the constable's blun-
der (such as when the constable had ample probable cause but "for-
got" to get a warrant), the cost is not disproportionate. Warrants are 
required because of the unjustifiably high risk that a police officer 
will subject an innocent person to a search. 163 If sanctions were un-
available so long as the search were fruitful, a policemen who sin-
cerely believed his own judgment to be correct would have little 
incentive to follow the fourth amendment and seek a warrant. 
Indeed, far from being disproportionately costly, the exclusion-
ary remedy is remarkably proportionate to the wrong. When the 
Government has evidence of crime that it should not have under the 
fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule puts the Government 
where the fourth amendment says it should be - without the 
evidence. 
No other remedy is this proportionate. 164 Juries may not take 
seriously tort or criminal remedies against offending policemen. 165 
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756-57 
(1970). 
160. E.g., 403 U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra ·note 159, at 736-37. 
161. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
162. Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender of State and Federal Criminal Laws: A Reply to 
Those Who Believe that the Court is Oblivious to the Needs of Law Eeforcement, 37 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1236 (1969). 
163. See text at note 6 supra. 
164. Criminal prosecutions of police officers who have violated the fourth amendment are 
unlikely to occur, and merit little attention. See Schroeder, supra note 156, at 1396-98. 
165. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Indi-
vidual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955); Plumb, Illegal Eeforcement of the Law, 24 COR-
NELL L.Q. 337, 385-91 (1939); Schroeder, supra note 156, at 1388-89. 
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When they are taken seriously, the deterrent effect may be too great. 
For example, a policeman might not wish to make any search for a 
relatively minor crime, such as the theft of a child's bicycle, if he 
knows that any "blunder'' will cost him a thousand dollars in dam-
ages or thirty days in jail. 166 
Chief Justice Burger's suggestion of government liability with 
liquidated damages for fourth amendment violations167 allows the 
Government to buy its way around the fourth amendment. For ex-
ample, if the Government wants evidence of a crime badly enough, 
it can decide to ransack a house for a thousand dollars. 168 From the 
individual policeman's perspective, the credit he would get from 
solving a murder would make it worth the demerits for an unlawful 
search. Conversely, as with individual liability, the prospect of de-
merits for an unlawful search for a stolen bicycle may deter even 
lawful searches on the assumption that the potential gains would not 
be worth the risk of being wrong. None of this suggests that reme-
dies other than the exclusionary rule should be entirely discarded, 
only that these other remedies are not so proportionate as the exclu-
sionary rule. 
The exclusionary rule protects innocent people by eliminating 
the incentive to search and seize unreasonably. 169 So long as a po-
liceman knows that any evidence he obtains in violation of the 
fourth amendment will not help secure a conviction he has less rea-
son to violate the amendment and more reason to try to understand 
166. Recognizing a good faith defense for damage actions to mitigate overdeterrence 
would incur the same difficulties as the recognition of such a defense in the suppression con-
text. See notes 172-175 i'!fra and accompanying text. A good faith defense to a tort suit is 
appropriate, however, so long as good faith is rejected when the more proportionate exclusion• 
ary rule is invoked. See note 174 i'!fra. 
167. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
168. Judge Posner finds no difficulty in allowing the government to buy its way around the 
fourth amendment. As he views it, if a particular search causes one hundred dollars worth of 
inconvenience ~d does ten thousand dollars worth of good, the government ought to conduct 
the search and pay the damages. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sur. CT. 
REV. 49, 55. Because I do not believe constitutional rights are for sale whenever the govern-
ment unilaterally decides to purchase them, I cannot accept his thesis. 
169. At least so long as the officer involved is seeking evidence that can be used to secure a 
conviction. The rule would not work if the officer is after something else. For example, in a 
Mendenhall situation, an agent who is confronted with a subject who refused lo consent may 
choose to harass the suspected drug carrier by subjecting her to an illegal search. The agent 
might reason that, given the unlikelihood of securing admissible evidence without the subject's 
consent, it would be preferable to conduct a consentless search than to let her go. If the agent 
discovered drugs pursuant to such a search, he could confiscate the contraband, thereby al 
least increasing the cost of drug trafficking. Cf. the search involving Paula Hughes in United 
States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1976), '!lfd., 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) (motion to suppress granted lo subject who refused to 
consent). 
April 1983] Protecting the Innocent 1267 
it. While there is some evidence that for various reasons the exclu-
sionary rule does not work perfectly, 170 there is no evidence that it 
does not work at all. 171 Indeed, it defies logic to believe that a po-
liceman's willingness to search without probable cause or a warrant 
(and thereby possibly subject an innocent person to an unjustifiable 
intrusion of privacy) is unrelated to whether he can gain any admis-
sible evidence from conducting the search. 
It has been suggested that the exclusionary rule be limited to bad 
faith violations. 172 Under this view, any intentional violation of an 
already-declared right would be subject to the exclusionary rule; 
other fourth amendment violations would not be. The difficulty with 
adoption of this "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule, as 
Wasserstrom and Mertens recently observed, is that the development 
of fourth amendment law would be retarded. 173 Indeed, with the 
170. E.g., Oaks, supra note 159, at 755 (there is little empirical evidence that the rule acts 
as a deterrent on law enforcement aimed at prosecution; the rule creates incentive for lying by 
police officers); cf. J. HIRSHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 84-86 (1979) (Hirshel surveyed 
police officers, district attorneys and defense attorneys, concluding that the exclusionary rule is 
an ineffective deterrent). But see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 395 n.138 (Hir-
shel's data belie his conclusion). 
171. See Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven Thal It Doesn't Deter Police? 
62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiollo Research and United Stales v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 740 (1974). 
Consider United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The district court found, and the 
reviewing courts accepted, that the government affirmatively instructed its agents to take ad-
vantage of the standing requirement by stealing the evidence while it was in the possession of a 
third party in contravention of the third party's fourth amendment rights. See 447 U.S. 727, 
743 (Marshall, J., dissenting). What better evidence could there be that the threat of suppres-
sion influences government conduct? 
That the government instructs its officers in fourth amendment law to avoid the exclusion 
of evidence is also relevant for the proposed good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The 
current compulsory suppression rule penalizes police ignorance of the law; the good faith ex-
ception would reward ignorance of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The good faith excep-
tion would be well-tailored for desensitizing the police to the constitutional rules ·constraining 
search and seizure. 
172. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); 
Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Pfeserve a Liberal Inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. SI (1980). Fortunately, the Supreme 
Court has heretofore refused to take this suggestion seriously. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. 
Ct. 2664, 2669 (1982). Cf. note 174 iefra and accompanying text. It has however, ordered 
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982), reargued and requested the parties 
to address the question whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial at 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment (citations omitted) should to 
any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
1035 Ct. at 436. The case was reargued Mar. 1, 1983. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3643 (summary ofora 
argument). 
173. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 451-52, 463. See also United States v 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 555-58 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. note 184iefra and accompa 
nying text. 
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exclusionary rule available as a vehicle for developing fourth 
amendment jurisprudence, it is reasonable to retain the good faith 
defense in tort suits where the remedy is not so proportionate to the 
wrong.174 To the extent that totally new search and seizure rules 
could not have been anticipated, the Court's retroactivity rules sub-
stantially blunt any negative impact of police reliance on the old 
rules. 175 Therefore, the good faith defense is neither desirable nor 
necessary in exclusionary rule cases. 
Three justifications are usually given for the exclusionary rule: 
(1) vindication of the personal rights of the defendant before the 
court, (2) deterrence of future violations, and (3) preservation of ju-
dicial integrity. 176 In recent years, the Court has required both the 
first and second justification as a predicate for the exclusionary 
rule. 177 It has refused to exclude the evidence unless exclusion 
would significantly deter police misconduct even though the party 
174. Since the decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has 
become the classic civil rights statute. It reads as follows: 
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. 
In actions under this statute, a defendant's culpability should be a factor in determining 
damages. It is reasonable and desirable that damages resulting from flagrant abuses of power 
be paid for by those that inflicted them. But to hold the wrongdoer personally responsible 
under all circumstances would render law enforcement impossible in any "borderline" situa-
tion. Few police officers would be willing to risk having to pay damages for making an arrest 
which they believed in good faith to be lawful. In contrast to the exclusionary rule, an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could result in a small claim against a police officer, or it could leave 
him bankrupt, without a good faith defense to protect the individual violator who has acted in 
the belief he is upholding the law. Our desire to see civil rights abusers punished would be 
vindicated, but at the expense of unjustly punishing police officers. 
175. A good faith defense would prohibit damages or suppression for a fourth amendment 
violation, unless the facts in a case were nearly identical to a previously decided case. Other-
wise, the police officer would not know that his or her action violated the fourth amendment, 
Since the officer would not be liable anyway, a court would have no reason to reach the ques-
tion of whether in fact the officer's actions did violate the fourth amendment. q: Ashcroft v. 
Mattis, 43LU.S.,l71 (1977) (Constitutionality of law permitting a police officer to use deadly 
force in effectuating an arrest was moot since even if the law were unconstitutional, the police 
officer relied in good faith upon the law which theretofore had not been declared unconstitu-
tional.); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 430 n.348. A good faith defense to a tort 
suit is appropriate, however, so long as the exclusionary rule is retained. See note 174 and 
accompanying text, supra. When a new fourth amendment rule is announced, it is prospective 
only. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). When a fourth amendment decision does 
not change a rule, but resolves a previously unsettled question, the decision will apply to cases 
for which direct review is still pending, but not to cases which have been finally adjudicated, 
See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982). 
176. See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 377-78; Kamisar, ls the Exclu-
sionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of The Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDI· 
CATURE 66, 67 (1978); Wilkey, supra note 152, at 200. 
177. Preservation of judicial integrity, if not entirely out of judicial favor, is little more 
than a makeweight argument. Recent references to it generally h:ive been in dissenting opin-
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seeking exclusion was personally the victim of an unlawful search 
and seizure. 178 On the other hand, it has also refused to exclude 
evidence when the defendant was not personally victimized by the 
unlawful search and seizure even though failure to exclude invited 
more unlawful searches.179 
Since the primary purpose of the fourth amendment ought to be 
protection of the innocent, the Court's principal focus should be on 
the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. 18° From this perspec-
tive, it should not matter whether the "incidental beneficiary" seeks 
vindication for his personal fourth amendment rights or seeks to ex-
clude evidence wrongfully obtained from another, perhaps innocent, 
person. Thus far, only California has accepted this proposition. 181 
Perhaps if the Supreme Court were to view the fourth amendment 
from the perspective of the innocent, it would be more willing to 
follow California. 182 
Under the Supreme Court's personal-vindication rule, the Gov-
ernment can use evidence obtained against third persons from an 
electronic eavesdropping device unlawfully installed in my house. 183 
The police can search my house without a w~rrant or probable 
cause, secure in the knowledge that any evidence they find against a 
third party will be admissible. 184 Even if the police deliberately sub-
ject an innocent person to a search because of their knowledge that 
the evidence will be admissible against their target subject, the evi-
ions. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
178. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978) (cost of excluding testimony 
of a witness said to be too high when deterrent effect on police conduct was speculative and 
unlikely); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348-52 (exclusionary rule may not be in-
voked by a grand jury witness; application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would not 
"significantly further" goal of deterrence of police misconduct). 
119. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant's fourth amendment 
rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party; respondent had no privacy interest in documents 
seized from the briefcase of a bank officer); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers 
in car, neither drivers nor owners and having no interest in the property seized, had no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or in the area underithe seat; did not 
have standing to challenge a search of the car); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) 
(codefendants and coconspirators have no special standing and cannot prevent the admission 
against them of information obtained through electronic surveillance that is illegal against 
another codefendant or coconspirator). 
180. Vindication of personal rights and judicial integrity should be viewed as incidental, 
but not unimportant, functions of the excl~sionary rule. 
181. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). 
182. Cf. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 120-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
183. Under the Alderman rule, the governmept could use information against a third per-
son in this hypothetical, assuming the third pers?f were not a party to the conversation being 
monitored. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.\165 (1969). 
184. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 6.S. 83 (1980). 
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dence will not be excluded.185 
From the perspective of the innocent, this rule is positively per-
verse. Assume that the police suspect that X has either hidden a gun 
in his home or in rs home. If the police search X's home without a 
warrant, they know that the gun will be inadmissible. But they can 
search rs home without a warrant, secure in the knowledge that if 
they find the gun it will be admissible against X 186 In the above 
situation, if the police had probable cause to believe that X's gun was 
hidden either in X's house or rs house, they probably could not get 
a warrant to search either house because of their inability to specify 
in which house irwas. 187 The Supreme Court's rule allows them to 
resolve the dilemma by searching innocent rs house first. If they 
find the gun, it is admissible against X,· if they don't, they now have 
probable cause and can get a warrant to search X's house. Adoption 
of the California rule would prevent this perversity. 188 
The Supreme Court's current trend has increased the opportunity 
for police to prey on the innocent. For example, prior to 1980 in the 
above hypothetical, if X owned the gun, he could object to its unlaw-
ful seizure from rs house189 because as the owner of the property 
seized, he was a personal victim of the fourth amendment viola-
tion.190 In 1980, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky 191 held that an 
185. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
186. X's ownership of the gun probably would not give him standing. See Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
187. There is little case law defining the fourth amendment's warrant criterion of "particu-
larly describing the place to be searched." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Where police seek to 
search two or more different places not owned or occupied by the same individual, one, court 
has said that separate warrants would be required. See Williams v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 131, 
134, 240 P.2d 1132, I 137 (1952). It would seem that in such a case, probable cause for issuance 
of separate warrants would not exist unless the information possessed by the police singled out 
the place to be searched. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1963) (arrest of 
an individual not lawful where there was no showing by police that they had information 
narrowing the scope of their search to that particular person); Mallory v. United States, 354 
U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (police may not make "at large" arrests of several subjects and use the 
interrogating process to determine for which subject they have "probable cause" to arrest). 
188. Even from the perspective of the guilty, tlte rule requiring personal injury does not 
work well. The current rule is not related to any standard of guilt. Let us vary the hypotheti-
cal in the text by assuming that Y is the ringleader in a conspiracy and X is a coconspirator. If 
the police illegally search rs house and seize the conspiracy plans which implicate X, then X 
can be successfully prosecuted. Y, however, can successfully challenge the illegal search and 
evade conviction. X goes to jail while Y, the big boss, is free to plan another spree. See Kelley 
v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582, 585 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 737 (1926). 
189. X could not, however, object to Y turning in the gun to the police. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484-90 (1971). Nor could X object to Y consenting to a search. 
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974). 
190. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
191. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
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owner of narcotics could not challenge their seizure pursuant to an 
unlawful search of a companion's purse. The Court reasoned that 
because Rawlings had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
companion's purse, his ownership of the seized property was insuffi-
cient to allow him to challenge the constitutionality of the search. 
Obviously, Rawlings encourages more speculative searches since evi-
dence not owned by the victim of the search will be admissible, even 
when the owner and victim are sitting side by side (as they were in 
Rawlings). 
Rawlings was foreshadowed by the unfortunate case of Rakas v. 
Illinois, 192 in which the Court held that passengers in an automobile 
who were stopped, searched, ordered out of the car at gunpoint, 193 
and deprived of transportation during the unconstitutional search of 
the automobile194 were not persons aggrieved by the unlawful 
search. The message to police is simple: "Stop any car you wish 
with multiple occupants. Any evidence that you find will be admis-
sible against all but the owner or driver." 195 Had Rakas been the 
law when Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 196 was decided, none of the 
analysis of that case would have been necessary. Bustamonte would 
have had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and the 
search would not have been unlawful as to him. 
Hostility toward the exclusionary rule no doubt motivated the 
Court in Rakas. It said: "Each time the exclusionary rule is applied 
it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of fourth amend-
ment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of 
fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected." 197 The decision, 
however, altered the right, not merely the remedy. An innocent per-
192. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
193. Appendix at 18, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
194. Since Rakas was denied standing, the constitutionality of the search was never deter-
mined. However, it is difficult to conceive that the police had probable cause to search the car 
under the facts in Rakas: police were looking for a 1970 blue Plymouth Roadrunner used as a 
getaway car after the robbery. The car was described as having a white racing stripe and 
damage to the front. The license was said to be SA, numbers unknown. The fleeing robbers 
were described as two white males, one wearing a blue shirt and dark jacket. Police stopped 
and searched at gunpoint a 1970 purple Roadrunner with no stripe or damage to the front. 
The car's license plate was RT-6237. The car had four occupants in it, two men and two 
women. One of the men was wearing a blue shirt. Just before the car was stopped, it was 
described as traveling at an unusually slow pace. See Appendix at 4-24, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978). However, before the car was stopped, the real getaway car had already been 
recovered. Brief for Petitioners at 6, id. Assuming that one could stretch to view these facts as 
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow the police to stop the vehicle, it is 
unimaginable that the police had probable cause for their gunpoint search. 
195. It is not clear whether a nonowner driver has standing, since the defendants in Rakas 
were neither owners nor drivers. · 
196. 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see text at notes 128-140 supra. 
197. 439 U.S. at 137. 
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son in Rakas' position would have no cause of action against the 
officer for any of the indignities to which he was subjected other than 
the search of his person. He could not sue for the inconvenience of 
the stop, the forced exit, or the time consumed during the search of 
the automobile. 198 Such is the unfortunate byproduct of treating the 
fourth amendment from the perspective of the guilty rather than the 
innocent. 
CONCLUSION 
The fourth amendment is designed to protect innocent people, 
ie., people who have not committed a crime or who do not possess 
sought-after evidence. Criminals or those who possess evidence of 
crime are allowed to object to the manner in which such evidence 
was obtained only because the search or seizure may have created an 
unjustifiably high risk of an intrusion upon an innocent person's pri-
vacy. Therefore, devices such as marijuana-sniffing dogs which can 
only detect contraband and do not intrude upon the innocent ought 
to be allowed regardless of probable cause or a warrant. 199 Many 
substantive fourth amendment decisions, particularly those dealing 
with expectations of privacy200 and consent,201 have focused on the 
rights of the guilty to such an extent that their impact on the inno-
cent has been lost. Finally, the Court has failed to recognize the 
value of the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the innocent. 
Consequently the rule has been restricted so much that it fails to 
offer innocent citizens the protection to which they should be entitled 
under the fourth amendment.202 
Unless the Court frankly recognizes that fourth amendment pro-
tections are for the innocent, it is unlikely that the problems identi-
fied in this Article will be rectified. 
198. In his concurring opinion in Rakas, Justice Powell states: "The petitioners do not 
challenge the constitutionality of the police action in stopping the automobile in which they 
were riding; nor do they complain of being made to get out of the vehicle," 439 U.S. at 150-51. 
Justice Powell's attempt to construe the issue narrowly as being whether the search after the 
petitioners had left the car violated their fourth amendment rights is not responsive to their 
argument. 
The petitioners' brief to the Supreme Court stated that they sought "an order which would 
require the state court to decide the ultimate question of whether the search was lawful." Brief 
for Petitioners at 8, id. The petitioners originally challenged the search of the car in which 
they were passengers in a suppression hearing in the 11linois state court system. In their mo-
tion to suppress, petitioners challenged the search on a number of grounds, among which were 
that police lacked probable cause to stop the car, that the passengers were ordered out of the 
car at gunpoint and that the subsequent search was not made incident to any lawful arrest. 
Appendix at 5, id. 
199. See Part II supra. 
200. See Part III supra. 
201. See Part IV supra. 
202. See Part V supra. 
